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Abstract. This paper asks a simple question: if humans and
their actions co-evolve with hydrological systems (Sivapalan
et al., 2012), what is the role of hydrological scientists, who
are also humans, within this system? To put it more di-
rectly, as traditionally there is a supposed separation of sci-
entists and society, can we maintain this separation as socio-
hydrologists studying a socio-hydrological world? This pa-
per argues that we cannot, using four linked sections. The
ﬁrst section draws directly upon the concern of science-
technology studies to make a case to the (socio-hydrological)
community that we need to be sensitive to constructivist ac-
counts of science in general and socio-hydrology in partic-
ular. I review three positions taken by such accounts and
apply them to hydrological science, supported with speciﬁc
examples: (a) the ways in which scientiﬁc activities frame
socio-hydrological research, such that at least some of the
knowledge that we obtain is constructed by precisely what
we do; (b) the need to attend to how socio-hydrological
knowledge is used in decision-making, as evidence suggests
that hydrological knowledge does not ﬂow simply from sci-
ence into policy; and (c) the observation that those who do
not normally label themselves as socio-hydrologists may ac-
tually have a profound knowledge of socio-hydrology. The
second section provides an empirical basis for considering
these three issues by detailing the history of the practice
of roughness parameterisation, using parameters like Man-
ning’s n, in hydrological and hydraulic models for ﬂood
inundation mapping. This history sustains the third section
that is a more general consideration of one type of socio-
hydrological practice: predictive modelling. I show that as
part of a socio-hydrological analysis, hydrological predic-
tion needs to be thought through much more carefully: not
only because hydrological prediction exists to help inform
decisions that are made about water management; but also
because those predictions contain assumptions, the predic-
tions are only correct in so far as those assumptions hold, and
for those assumptions to hold, the socio-hydrological system
(i.e. the world) has to be shaped so as to include them. Here,
I add to the “normal” view that ideally our models should
represent the world around us, to argue that for our models
(and hence our predictions) to be valid, we have to make the
world look like our models. Decisions over how the world
is modelled may transform the world as much as they rep-
resent the world. Thus, socio-hydrological modelling has to
become a socially accountable process such that the world is
transformed, through the implications of modelling, in a fair
and just manner. This leads into the ﬁnal section of the pa-
per where I consider how socio-hydrological research may
be made more socially accountable, in a way that is both
sensitive to the constructivist critique (Sect. 1), but which re-
tains the contribution that hydrologists might make to socio-
hydrological studies. This includes (1) working with conﬂict
and controversy in hydrological science, rather than trying
to eliminate them; (2) using hydrological events to avoid be-
coming locked into our own frames of explanation and pre-
diction; (3) being empirical and experimental but in a socio-
hydrological sense; and (4) co-producing socio-hydrological
predictions. I will show how this might be done through
a project that speciﬁcally developed predictive models for
making interventions in river catchments to increase high
river ﬂow attenuation. Therein, I found myself becoming de-
tached from my normal disciplinary networks and attached
to the co-production of a predictive hydrological model with
communities normally excluded from the practice of hydro-
logical science.
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1 Introduction
“No one sees the earth globally and no one sees an ecological
system from nowhere, the scientist no more than the citizen,
thefarmerortheecologist–or,lestweforget,theearthworm.
Nature is no longer what is embraced from a far away point
of view where the observer could ideally jump to see things
“as a whole”, but the assemblage of contradictory entities
that have to be composed together.” (B. Latour, 2011)
The thesis of this paper welcomes the potential of socio-
hydrology (after Sivapalan et al., 2012) as part of a new
decade of hydrological activity concerned with prediction
under change. However it argues that, if we live and work
within landscapes where society and water have both co-
evolved and are intimately connected, how we predict water
within those landscapes must also be considered as a socio-
hydrological problem.
To introduce my argument, I start with a quote from
Sivapalanetal.(2011)concernedwiththechallengeofsocio-
hydrology: “Explicitly confronting hydrological prediction
with human behaviour poses challenges in the description
and quantiﬁcation of hydrological systems in terms that are
meaningful in economic or policy frameworks ... Given the
multiple scales, multiple decision-makers and multiple pro-
cesses that drive the evolution of coupled human and water
systems, they pose enormous challenges for prediction over
long time scales.” (p. 8, my emphasis in italic)
This quote is instrumental for this paper because it em-
phasises that hydrological science, and especially socio-
hydrological science, is a science that actively matters:
whether through securing the safe supply of clean water,
sustaining vital ecosystem services or deﬁning strategies to
avoid our exposure to extreme hydrological events, it is a sci-
ence intimately bound with society and its needs. Yet it also
emphasises that socio-hydrology is a science that is shaped
by economic and/or policy frameworks. Such shaping arises
for two reasons:
1. prediction of the future is not an open-ended process;
rather it requires a series of important assumptions to
be made about what should be included in the predic-
tive model used, which elements are to be left station-
ary and which are to be left dynamic, etc. (Lane et al.,
2011a), effectively a series of acts of framing by the
scientists involved; and
2. because social futures are not well deﬁned in a socio-
hydrological world, this framing is as much about
statements about what the social could be, even should
be. That is, whilst framing of futures may have a sci-
entiﬁc basis (e.g. in future rainfall predictions), in a
socio-hydrological world there will be many other el-
ements to this framing over which a hydrological sci-
entist cannot claim a particular privilege.
Socio-hydrology clearly represents an exciting opportu-
nity, as it offers the potential for a series of innovative
collaborations between hydrological scientists and social
scientists to develop new ways of understanding socio-
hydrological systems and perhaps to develop new predictive
approaches. There is also a debate to be had over precisely
what the hydrological contribution might be to understand-
ing in socio-hydrology, given that social scientists have been
studying the co-evolution of social and hydrological systems
for very many years (see the classic text by Wittfogel (1957),
forexample).Thispaperdoesnotaddressthisdebate.Rather,
it looks critically at the notion of socio-hydrology through
a different perspective, that provided by science technol-
ogy studies (STS), and in so doing, it argues, for hydro-
logical scientists who might be interested in working in a
socio-hydrological framework, that socio-hydrological prac-
tice will need much more than the “bolting on” of social sci-
ence questions to hydrological science questions. It will re-
quire a wholesale rethink of how we practise hydrological
science within a socio-hydrological project.
STS provide a theoretical framework for this rethinking.
The last few decades have seen the development of what
has been called a “sociological turn” in studies of science
(Collins and Evans, 2002). The essence of this turn has been
a shift away from debates over the ideal form that science
should take so as to guarantee that scientists have special ac-
cess to the truth. The new focus has been upon how science
is practised and what this means for the position of science
in society, such as in making decisions. As I review below,
this has revealed that
1. science as practised (e.g. the conduct of a research
project) is not necessarily the same as science as it is
portrayed (e.g. in the structure of a scientiﬁc article)
and how science is practised shapes fundamentally the
scientiﬁc knowledge that is generated;
2. policy-making is not simply based upon the results of
scientiﬁc enquiry; and
3. “scientists” are not the only individuals within society
that have scientiﬁc expertise; rather, scientiﬁc knowl-
edge is more widely distributed amongst those who
have a particular experience or interest of the problems
that commonly interest scientists.
Collins and Evans (2002) conceive this as a turn away
from a “ﬁrst wave” of science studies, concerned with how to
maintain science as the basis for difﬁcult policy- or decision-
making, towards a “second wave” of science studies, that
challenges the traditional privilege accorded to science in
decision-making. This second wave showed that scientiﬁc
knowledgewas,insomesenses,“constructed”bythespeciﬁc
actions and practices of the scientists involved in producing
it, so challenging the ideal notion that through the separation
of science from society, it is possible to provide objective
accounts of those questions of interest to society. As such,
the second wave was largely analytical. What it was not, and
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what Collins and Evans argue that it should be, was norma-
tive, that is, prescriptive of how science should be practised
given what the constructivist account showed. Without what
Collins and Evans describe as a “third wave”, there is a risk
of rejection of scientiﬁc knowledge as a critical contributor
to the difﬁcult decisions that have to be made in an era of
potential environmental crisis (see also Demeritt, 2006). A
third wave of science studies is needed that prescribes how
best to sustain the contribution that science has to make to
societal decision-making.
The primary aim of this paper is to think through the
possible contribution of hydrological science to understand-
ing, and perhaps predicting, a socio-hydrological world. First
(Sect. 2), I begin by illustrating, using hydrological exam-
ples, the three points above, so as to consider how predictive
socio-hydrological science should be practised to establish
its legitimate contribution to policy- and/or decision-making.
At the start of a new decade of hydrological science con-
cerned with prediction, we have a profound opportunity to
do this. The second (Sect. 3) provides an empirical example
of the construction of hydrological knowledge in practice,
by detailing the history of roughness parameterisation, using
parameters like Manning’s n, in hydrological and hydraulic
models. As a third point (Sect. 4), I use this example to show
why we need a “third wave” of science studies if the evolv-
ing discipline of socio-hydrology is to fulﬁl its potential, that
is, we need to rethink the traditional view of the relation-
ship between hydrological expertise and society. Fourthly, in
Sect. 5, I introduce a set of principles that might contribute to
such a rethinking and illustrate their implementation through
a speciﬁc case example. The paper contains a mixture of re-
view as well as primary evidence, the latter obtained from a
project concerned with new forms of participation in ﬂood
risk management (Lane et al., 2011b).
2 A constructivist account of hydrological practice
In this ﬁrst section, I draw directly upon science-technology
studies to introduce to hydrologists the case for a construc-
tivist account of science in general and hydrology in partic-
ular. At the outset, this engages with a set of literature that
will not be familiar to the hydrological scientist, but which is
important because it shows that the constructivist account is
one that parodies elements of conventional scientiﬁc method
in general, and our practices as hydrologists in particular:
that is, it is based upon empirical observation of science in
practice, in the same ways in which a hydrological scientist
might focus upon, for example, the observation of river ﬂow.
Whereas the subject of hydrology tends to be “things to do
with water”, the subject of STS as considered in this paper is
“hydrological science and how it is practised”. I make three
points.Theﬁrstdrawsuponworkdonelargelyinthescience-
technology studies community, which includes philosophers,
sociologists, historians and geographers amongst others, that
has sought to understand how scientists construct knowledge
about the natural world. The work has shown that rather than
scientiﬁc activity simply ﬁnding out about the real world, sci-
ence as a practice involves deﬁning what that world is, as
we come to know it. The second considers evidence of how
hydrological knowledge is used in decision-making, which
questions the traditional assumption that such knowledge can
be a simple basis of informing difﬁcult policy decisions. The
third demonstrates the deep and sometimes profound knowl-
edge of hydrological science that those often labelled as “lay
people” may have, and which suggests that there is a much
broader community of potential hydrological scientists who
have to be considered in a socio-hydrological account. Each
of the three accounts is well developed in science-technology
studies (STS) in general, and so the review is brief. As my
examples will show, hydrology has generally escaped such
analysis as compared with environmental concerns (e.g. cli-
mate change; genetically modiﬁed organisms and the food
chain; nuclear power) that share the similar challenges of un-
derstanding complex, open systems (Wiman, 1991).
2.1 Framing and the construction of scientiﬁc
knowledge
My ﬁrst entry point can be traced back to a Polish scientist,
Ludwig Fleck who in 1935 published a book Genesis and
Development of a Scientiﬁc Fact, translated into English in
1979. This book was an historical account of our scientiﬁc
understanding of the disease syphilis, important because it
showed how both thought and experience combine to con-
struct scientiﬁc knowledge (Rosenkrantz, 1981). Fleck intro-
duced the idea that our general conceptions frame scientiﬁc
practices (e.g. what to measure, how to measure) just as what
we do shapes those conceptions. His ideas predated but par-
allel those of Kuhn (1962) in that Fleck talks of “thought
collectives” or “thought styles” as the dominant conceptions
that frame and constrain scientiﬁc practice: that is, we of-
ten work within communities (research groups, for example)
that tend to deﬁne or to frame the kinds of approaches that
we used. Fleck’s work is a major precursors of the construc-
tivist account of scientiﬁc knowledge as: (1) it challenges at-
tempts to deﬁne science as a simple process of correcting
concepts, ideas or theories (whether inductively from obser-
vations, deductively by validating theories or by falsiﬁcation
through showing extant theories to be incorrect); and (2) it
shows how a combined historical and ethno-methodological
approach can help to understand how scientiﬁc knowledge is
constructed. That is, we can study how science is practised
through observing it, as we might study inﬁltration of wa-
ter into a soil, spatial patterns of surface runoff etc. Whilst
Fleck’s concern was, in particular, an historical account of
why and how the Wassermann Reactor was identiﬁed in 1906
as a test for syphilis, it also drew upon his own experience
(i.e. it was auto-ethno-methodological) as a bacteriologist.
This emphasis on experience has become central to many
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constructivist accounts in that, in a way that parodies the
traditional activities of ﬁeld hydrological scientists, they are
based upon explicit observation of science in practice.
One of the ﬁrst attempts to reveal science as practised is
found in the book by Latour and Woolgar (1979), Laboratory
Life: The Social Construction of Scientiﬁc Facts. Latour and
Woolgar argue that a focus on practice is necessary because
the publication of “systematic and tidied research reports”
(p. 29) does not illuminate the realities by which knowledge
comes about, and hence precisely what the status of scientiﬁc
knowledge is. Through an anthropological study of medical
scientistRogerGuillemin’smedicallaboratoryattheSalkIn-
stitute, California, Latour and Woolgar make four (amongst
other)importantobservations.First,theyshowedthatthema-
terial, technical and human resources of the laboratory de-
termined the challenges afforded in practising science and
the facts that were found, whether through the logic of de-
ductive reasoning or the observations behind inductive rea-
soning. There was clearly an act of framing of knowledge
by the resources assembled in the laboratory. Second, they
considered what constitutes facts in a laboratory setting and
they noted that in scientiﬁc papers produced by the labora-
tory, it was possible to identify a “continuum of facticity”
(p. 76) between those statements that could be taken as given
(facts) and those that were speculative. The work of the lab-
oratory was to move statements from speculation to given.
Third, they observed that “reality” and “fact” was not nec-
essarily the same thing. There were statements used in the
laboratory that were “considered too costly to modify” and
that these “constitute what is referred to as reality” (p. 243)
in the laboratory, regardless of their status as facts. I will il-
lustrate this point with respect to the widely used roughness
parameter, Manning’s n (in Sect. 3). Fourth, they showed that
facts emerge in networks of scientists (and the things that
they study) and that it is these networks that give facts their
meaning. Without the network, the meaning of a fact may
evolve or even take on a new form: the networks produce
this meaning; and the meaning only survives as long as the
network can maintain it.
The key implication that arises from these four points is
that the claim to scientiﬁc authority that arises from pursuit
of a rigorous scientiﬁc method, one reproduced in the pages
of scientiﬁc papers and reports, cannot be sustained. Scien-
tiﬁc papers are, at once, both a valuable outcome of scientiﬁc
activity (new scientiﬁc knowledge) but also a misrepresen-
tation of how that knowledge is produced in practice. The
Latour and Woolgar (1979) study stimulated both: debate
over method (e.g. Lynch, 1982) and substance (e.g. Tilley,
1981; Stewart, 1982) but also a wave of similar studies of
scientiﬁc practice (e.g. Shackley et al., 1999 in relation to
climate change); and an extension to consider technology,
the latter showing that the same argument developed for a
sociology of scientiﬁc knowledge could equally be used in a
sociology of technological innovation (e.g. chapters in Bijker
et al., 1987).
There is now a set of studies in the environmental sciences,
still relatively small, that have sought to develop Latour
and Woolgar’s ideas so as to understand how environmental
knowledge is produced, both in general, and with reference
to environmental prediction in particular (e.g. Shackley et al.,
1999;Lahsen,2005;Demeritt,2006;Sundberg,2009;Brysse
et al., 2013). Latour, who remains one of the key researchers
in this ﬁeld, also came close to the domain of hydrology
when he joined a scientiﬁc expedition to the Amazon con-
cerned with understanding the dynamics of tropical rain for-
est expansion and contraction at its margins with savannah:
where is the boundary and how is it moving (Latour, 1999a)?
Latour’s (1999a) work provides some key ideas here for how
hydrology is practised, that are expanded on in Sect. 3. La-
tour describes how a how a botanist, a soil scientist and a
geomorphologist tease out, selectively and in a single geo-
graphical location, a set of relationships from an environ-
ment that at ﬁrst glance appears to be disorganised and be-
yond explanation, not unlike classic challenges in ﬁeld hy-
drological science (e.g. complex space–time patterns of soil
moisture distribution). Latour notes that each scientist brings
to the research process particular kinds of “inscription de-
vices”, those are objects (e.g. equipment, measurement pro-
tocols) that make the ﬁeld site measurable according to the
wider approaches and presumptions associated with each sci-
entist’s discipline. The devices (e.g. a standardised soil ten-
siometer) are critical, as they homogenise the study of very
different ﬁeld environments, making them comparable both
to one another and to the academic world of that discipline.
The ﬁeld site can be made knowable on the basis of each dis-
cipline’s dominant terms of reference: the “référence circu-
lante”.Toarriveatthispoint,thecomplexityoftherealworld
is progressively reduced (as it is in the laboratory) through a
series of steps of “translation” so as to lose its local focus
and to amplify its general representativeness and eventually
to allow it to be written in a form typical of a “scientiﬁc”
document such as a research paper. Latour (1999a) argues
that understanding what is being done here requires both a
realist and a relativist perspective, realist because scientiﬁc
activity is constrained by the real world (Gooding, 1990) and
these constraints survive through the translation; but relative
because, unavoidably, what we know about the real world
is constructed, or framed, through the process of translation,
that is, science as practised.
If we think about what this might mean in relation to hy-
drological science, Latour and Woolgar (1979) and Latour’s
subsequent work (1999) raise questions as to: what are those
components of hydrological investigation that are proving
too costly to modify and why are they so ﬁxed? (candidates
might include the Nash–Sutcliffe index of Efﬁciency or the
topographic index, for example); how do we choose ﬁeld
sites and translate them into generic ﬁndings, and how is gen-
eralisation done more generally?; and what role does prac-
tice play in shaping hydrological knowledge? In answering
each of these questions, we have to consider how it is that
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the ﬁndings of hydrological activity are framed by the deci-
sions that hydrologists make and, through this framing, par-
ticular accounts of the hydrological world become dominant
over others. It implies a need for empirical observation of
hydrology in practice, something that is illustrated in Sect. 3.
2.2 Science in decision-making
The second element of the constructivist account of knowl-
edge is concerned with observations of how scientiﬁc knowl-
edge translates into decision-making. Here, I deﬁne decision-
making broadly, to relate to those situations where there is
some kind of translation of scientiﬁc knowledge into deci-
sions that have to be made to develop or to modify policy,
as well as in relation to more speciﬁc cases, where a par-
ticular scientiﬁc ﬁnding is used to inform a particular man-
agement intervention. As with previous sections concerned
with scientiﬁc practice, this second element has also been
strongly empirical (see for example, Wynne, 1992; Demeritt,
2001, 2006; Bickerstaff and Simmons, 2004; Pielke, 2007;
Liken, 2010; Oreskes and Conway, 2010), that is, the re-
lationship between science and decision-making has been
traced historically and used to challenge the simple assump-
tion that scientiﬁc knowledge translates simply, or “linearly”
into decision-making, the “linear model”. Under this head-
ing, there are three broad elements of critique (Beck, 2011):
(1) that science produces certainty by reducing uncertainty,
and so can aid the taking of difﬁcult decisions; (2) that sci-
entiﬁc knowledge can be a basis of resolving political dis-
cord; and (3) that through the exclusion of politics from sci-
ence, scientiﬁc knowledge becomes a more rational basis for
decision-making than other kinds of knowledge.
2.2.1 Science and the assumption that scientiﬁc
research reduces uncertainty
Wynne(1992)provideswhathasbecomeaclassicanalysisof
uncertainty surrounding science. He argues (see also Beven,
2008) that uncertainty should be unpacked into a typology of
1. risk (the quantiﬁable probability of an event happen-
ing), elsewhere known as aleatory or stochastic uncer-
tainty, but that can be quantiﬁed;
2. (true) uncertainty (known but unquantiﬁable probabil-
ities), again that may be aleatory or stochastic, but
where the uncertainty cannot be quantiﬁed;
3. ignorance (the not yet known but potentially know-
able, often described as “we don’t know what we don’t
know”), also known as epistemic uncertainty; and
4. indeterminacy (that which cannot be known), some-
times also referred to as Knightian uncertainty.
Wynne (1992) argues science may contribute to the quan-
tiﬁcation of risk (Type 1) and the analysis of uncertainty
(Type 2) in ways that make it better known. Yet ignorance or
epistemic uncertainty is endemic, not least because science is
actively involved in creating products and processes whose
effects may not be knowable before their creation (e.g. ge-
netically modiﬁed crops). Indeterminacy questions the very
ability to analyse and to predict certain things, notably at the
interface with the social world.
Wynne illustrates this typology by tracing the re-
lationship between science and decision-making post-
Chernobyl (1986) radio caesium fall-out and its impact upon
upland soils in the UK. Scientists initially thought that the
radio caesium would be rapidly immobilised on the basis of
previous experimental testing. Still it was not, because the
soils exposed to the heaviest fall out were acidic, whereas
the experimental soils were alkaline. The experimental re-
sults did not translate completely beyond the experimental
case. The initial failure of scientists to conclude that the ra-
dio caesium would remain mobile was a classic example of
scientiﬁc progress: a basic theory based upon prior under-
standing proved to be incorrect, and so new scientiﬁc under-
standing was obtained.
The progress of learning through mistakes, described
above, might be used to conclude that science has re-
duced uncertainty, but three points challenge the notion
that science can aid difﬁcult decision-making by reduc-
ing uncertainty. First, it is well-established that science ad-
vances through a process of examination, revision and re-
examination (Oreskes, 2004), a process in which scientiﬁc
progress is most rapid when existing knowledge claims are
no longer found to hold. If science proceeds through falsi-
ﬁcation, and this falsiﬁcation happens publically, then the
claimed authority of science may become questioned in a
very public way. Wynne (1992) reports exactly how this hap-
pened amongst local communities in his study when radio
caesium was not rapidly immobilised, and wider concerns
emerged regarding the general authority of scientists regard-
ing the safety of Sellaﬁeld, the adjacent nuclear waste pro-
cessing plant. The same occurs with ﬂood risk maps that are
generally right in that they can achieve inundation patterns
that are 80 to 90% accurate (e.g. Yu and Lane, 2006) but
wrong in the detail that matters in relation to those who live
with ﬂood risk (the remaining 10 to 20%) as well as ineffec-
tive in scientiﬁc terms, as a means of enabling model calibra-
tion (Stephens et al., 2012). Thus, such maps can be the ori-
gin of signiﬁcant hydrological controversy both within and
beyond scientiﬁc communities (Lane, 2013). If the nature of
science is to proceed through showing elements of scientiﬁc
knowledge to be incorrect, then this implies the translation
of supposed certainties into supposed uncertainties which in
turn motivates new scientiﬁc enquiry. Science proceeds by
producing uncertainty and not certainty.
Second, the nature of “ignorance” is that we do not know
what else we do not know, especially in environmental sys-
tems where there may be both an incomplete knowledge
of critical processes and where the inﬂuence of local or
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contingent conditions may signiﬁcantly shape environmental
response (e.g. Wiman, 1991; Trudgill and Richards, 1997),
as with Wynne’s example. The environment has a complexity
that commonly places research far from the closed world of
the laboratory (Irwin, 2001). The certainty that results, then,
is largely conditioned upon the assumptions needed to re-
alise said certainty, and I consider this issue in relation to
predictive modelling below. Alongside scientiﬁc certainty is
the production of a series of epistemic uncertainties associ-
ated with the need to make that science certain; yet, vagaries
of the environment serve to make scientiﬁc knowledge inher-
ently uncertain.
Third, evidence shows that when policy is faced with new
scientiﬁc ﬁndings, that policy can remain relatively stable,
because it is sustained by and in turn sustains a suite of
other issues which constrain the extent to which new scien-
tiﬁc knowledge can be translated into policy. That is, even if
the above two concerns regarding scientiﬁc uncertainty can
be overcome, the scope of scientiﬁc enquiry rarely extends to
the full range of constraints that may make a particular deci-
sionmoreorlessacceptable.Forinstance,Laneetal.(2011a)
considered the history of the 20% uplift in peak ﬂow mag-
nitudes that ﬂood risk modellers were expected to use in
England and Wales up until recently to account for possible
future climate change. They show that new work that chal-
lenged the UK-wide application of this uplift (for catchments
of different scales in different geographical regions) failed to
change an established policy. The reasons invoked for this
were largely related to a societal decision about the need to
be conservative regarding safety in relation to climate change
impacts and neither the scientiﬁc ﬁndings nor the associated
uncertainties themselves.
In summary, this sub-section shows that we cannot as-
sume that science produces simple certainties by reducing
uncertainty: science proceeds by discovering its own uncer-
tainties; in environmental systems, it commonly relies on as-
sumptions that will produce epistemic uncertainty and that,
even if these concerns can be resolved, scientiﬁc knowledge
is rarely the only information that informs policy-making.
The latter point leads directly into the observation that sci-
ence cannot be assumed to be a sufﬁcient basis for resolving
political discord.
2.2.2 Science and the resolution of political discord
It is commonly assumed in the linear model of science into
decision-making that science is a means of resolving politi-
cal discord. The assumption here is that faced with difﬁcult
decisions, science can provide an objective guide to what de-
cisions need to be taken. A number of explicitly hydrological
examples regarding conﬂicts over water have challenged this
view (e.g. Kropp, 2005; Wesselink et al., 2009; Weber et al.,
2011; Austin et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2012). For instance,
Kropp (2005) describes the debate over renewal of water li-
cense abstractions for hydroelectric power exploitation in the
River Isar, Germany. This was initially a tri-partite debate
between the hydropower company, state authorities and the
Isar Alliance, a network of conservation interests, environ-
mentalists, political parties etc. Debate between them was
unable to agree on a way forward and so a Restwasserstudie
was commissioned (a “remaining water study”). This report
created more and not less controversy regarding for example
water quality standards and the objectives of water conser-
vation, causing Kropp to conclude (2005, p. 490) that “once
again, the modern hope of depoliticising a conﬂict through
the involvement of scientists and expertise, that is, negotia-
tions of facts instead of values, proved vain.” Kropp’s study
illustrates clearly the point that even with scientiﬁc knowl-
edge there are steps in the translation of this knowledge into
decisions that are negotiated and are concerned with values.
In turn, this causes us to question the assumption that science
alone can provide a rational basis for decision-making, that
is, it is necessary but not sufﬁcient.
2.2.3 The rational basis of science
It is often argued that for science to provide a rational basis
for making decisions, the scientist must exclude the context,
their values, interests and beliefs, within which they perform
their research. This can be a challenge, especially when sci-
entists are working in highly visible research areas and are
increasingly required to frame their research in terms of ben-
eﬁts to society. Evidence also suggests that the goal of trying
to do this can actively shape scientiﬁc outcomes: not only is
it hard to be rational in relation to highly emotive research
questions, but the act of trying to be so changes what scien-
tiﬁc knowledge is generated. In relation to climate change,
for instance, Wynne (2010) and Brysse et al. (2013) have
shown that through attempts to be objective, rational and
sceptical, climate scientists have tended to err on the side of
less rather than more alarmist predictions of future climate.
Wynne (2010) argues that a series of “cultural-economic ha-
bituated practices and global economic relations” (p. 299)
has caused climate change scientists to focus upon future
mean climate change (e.g. temperature rise) rather than the
more alarming and more certain climate extremes: “only
‘digestible’ and (thought-to-be) ‘manageable’ future climate
changes are recognised as scientiﬁcally accredited” (p. 297)
and therefore worthy of scientiﬁc investigation.
In a more directly hydrological example, Lane et
al. (2011a) show how the practice of ﬂood risk modelling
in the UK has had to be constrained by a series of political
decisions surrounding how cost-beneﬁt analysis is to be im-
plemented (e.g. the time horizon over which costs and bene-
ﬁts must be integrated). Whilst the output, then, is a series of
ﬂoodriskmapsand,inturn,aprioritisationofwheretoinvest
in ﬂood risk management, these supposedly objective ﬁnd-
ings hide a series of decisions necessary for their making that
have no basis in ﬂood science itself. It is extremely mislead-
ing to argue that such outputs are “rational” and “objective”
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because they are “scientiﬁc”, when they obscure a series of
deeper social and economic assumptions, which are rarely
exposed in the maps themselves, assumptions that are neces-
sary to make the maps. To summarise, as Irwin (2001, p. 74)
notes “... the “facts” of environmental matters do not speak
for themselves: instead they are actively created and inter-
preted. Similarly, nature can no longer be represented as an
external category. Statements about the natural world repre-
sent social and institutional constructions.”
2.2.4 The co-evolution of science with policy
Concerns over the supposed certainty of scientiﬁc knowl-
edge, evidence that science is not sufﬁcient in resolving po-
litical discord, and questions over the extent to which scien-
tiﬁc knowledge can be a rational basis for decision-making
suggest that science does not ﬂow linearly or simply into
decision-making as might be assumed. To replace the lin-
ear model, it is appropriate to see science and society, in-
cluding decision-making, as in a state of co-evolution, with
one impacting the other. This ties directly into the notion of
socio-hydrology, with its emphasis upon the co-evolution of
water with society but suggests that hydrological scientists
cannot claim to be separate from this system: the practice of
hydrological science, in a socio-hydrological framework, is
both constrained and enabled by the socio-hydrological sys-
tem within which it is practised, and the system will evolve
in response to the practice of hydrological science as part of
an evolving process of social change.
If this is the case, then we might expect there to be at
least some geographical differentiation in the scientiﬁc and
technical cultures that arise surrounding water: that is, the
production of distinctive socio-hydrological systems each on
their own path trajectory, as they evolve. Such differentiation
was demonstrated in a series of articles by Bijker (2007a, b).
He poses a simple question: “How is it possible that the
USA failed to keep New Orleans dry, when large parts of
the Netherlands can exist below sea level?” His argument is
that, of course, there are differences in the geographical and
geological setting of the two countries (the Netherlands is
a more “watery country” than the USA, in Bijker’s terms).
He shows however that such a conclusion is insufﬁcient, not
least because the science of land–ocean reactions does, in
theory, follow a near-universal set of process laws. Yet, he
argues that both countries have evolved completely different
socio-hydrological systems, ones that shape exactly how sci-
entiﬁc and engineering understanding is translated into wa-
ter management. For instance, the Dutch have evolved a sys-
tem of highly centralised action, built upon the collaboration
necessary under penalty of being ﬂooded but also the wider
belief in the malleability of society through state action. In
turn, this has deﬁned the scientiﬁc priorities of Dutch water
management and produced a series of approaches to water
management that have sustained strong state action. Rather
than science ﬂowing linearly into the shaping of particular
technologicalculturesandpolicydecisions,scienceandtech-
nology have mutually co-evolved to create very different
technological and policy settings. These contain a certain
amount of resistance to change, e.g. in response to scientiﬁc
development,becauseoftheextenttowhichtheyarestrongly
inter-related. Understanding how socio-hydrological systems
are made requires us to look carefully at not just how hydro-
logical science is practised, as Sect. 2.1 suggests, but also at
how (hydrological) scientiﬁc practices have evolved within
socio-hydrological systems, in ways that are mutually con-
stitutive of those systems.
2.3 Certiﬁed and non-certiﬁed hydrological experts
The third direction in a constructivist account of hydrolog-
ical practice recognises that expertise in hydrological pro-
cesses and systems is much more distributed than might be
thought. In any area of science that is strongly bound with
society (e.g. hydrological science) then problems will arise if
scientiﬁc knowledge (and its emphasis upon impersonal ob-
servation) becomes detached from meaning (and its embed-
ded experience) (Jasanoff, 2010). Jasanoff (see also Wynne,
2010) takes the example of climate change, where the work
of the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change success-
fully established climate change as a global problem but
in doing so they distanced climate change from its embed-
ded experience, thus undermining those social institutions
and ethical commitments that rely upon “the subjective, sit-
uated and normative imaginations of human actors engag-
ing with nature” (p. 235). Jasanoff argues that it is precisely
these social institutions and ethical commitments that need to
evolve if there is to be a sufﬁcient response to the challenges
posed by climate change. There are two distinctive interpre-
tations here: (1) those who live with environmental concerns
may hold substantial knowledge of those concerns, acquired
through experience, that is in some senses no different from
the ways in which scientists might obtain that knowledge;
and (2) those institutions and commitments that we will rely
upon to manage those concerns are sustained by more than
just the knowledge that science can provide.
2.3.1 The distribution of hydrological expertise
The notion that human actors, through their engagement with
nature, may have substantial expertise is a direct challenge to
traditional approaches that have followed an approach to sci-
ence known as the “deﬁcit model” (e.g. Eden and Tunstall,
2006; Petts and Brooks, 2006). The deﬁcit model assumes
that science is sufﬁcient but the public are deﬁcient (Sturgis
and Allum, 2002) and, with distinct parallels with the linear
model of science into policy, scientiﬁc knowledge needs to
be transformed into public understanding through public ed-
ucation. The Royal Society of England and Wales sees this as
the twin responsibilities of a scientist: “The ﬁrst is to attempt
an accurate assessment of the potential implications for the
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Table 1. A comparison of non-certiﬁed expert knowledge, as recorded during an experiment in public participation in ﬂood risk management
(Lane et al., 2011b), with the equivalent description that a certiﬁed expert (a scientist) might make of the same phenomenon. CG stands for
“Competency Group” (see below) and the number refers to the meeting number.
Non-certiﬁed expert knowledge (local people) Certiﬁed expert knowledge (scientist)
CG1: “Because of course it depends where you are, because if you are closer to the The depth dependence of frictional
main channel, you have got something rushing really fast. But the rest of it resistance in river–ﬂoodplain ﬂows, an
is spreading out ... it doesn’t tend to be moving at great speeds, it is just sort of assumption that is central to the diffusion
spreading out.” wave approximation of the 2-D shallow
water equations
CG2: “Logic says that you have got to work out the contours and work out which is the Potential energy as a momentum source
lowest lying land. I suppose there must be some sort of formula to work out exactly the coupled to the principle of volume
volume of water you are expecting to come down and therefore to what volume it will conservation for an incompressible ﬂuid
ﬁll that level.”
CG2: “But Pickering is a slower process I think, than Sinnington is. And it is not such a Hydrograph attenuation
sudden thing. I mean you can see Sinnington rising. I don’t think you can here so
much. [because] Pickering Beck goes much further north, and it is gathering more
water.”
CG2: “The other thing that is important is that we have got heavy clay soil. But the Inﬁltration and runoff generation as
soils vary in different parts, whereas of course the clay soil around Great Barugh controlled by soil type
means that other areas are more sandy perhaps and drain more easily.”
CG3: “So to protect Pickering, the nearer the dams are to Pickering the better?” (Local Design of ﬂood storage schemes to remove
member 1) “Well yes certainly” (Local member 2) ﬂood wave peaks
public. The second is to ensure the timely and appropriate
communication to the public of results if such communica-
tion is in the public interest” (Royal Society, 2006, p. 5).
Callon (1999) argues that the “public education model” re-
lies upon intermediaries (e.g. public authorities) that are the
contact points between scientists and the public and that it
can only succeed when these contact points are based upon
relations of trust. Problems arise when such notions of trust
become damaged and a major reason for such damage is that
through their day-to-day experience of nature, quite substan-
tial expertise may develop: most publics have elements of
expertise because they possess “speciﬁc, particular and con-
crete knowledge and competencies, the fruit of their experi-
ence and observations” (Callon, 1999, p. 85). As the knowl-
edge that science can deliver about the real world is in-
evitably incomplete (see, for example, Wynne, 1992 and the
example of ﬂood risk maps described above), it is always
at risk of becoming contested when it is confronted by pub-
lic expertise in particular situations. Empirical evidence sug-
gests that such expertise is much more broadly distributed
than has hitherto been thought (e.g. Wynne, 1992; Darier et
al., 1999), prompting some (e.g. Collins and Evans, 2002)
to make the distinction between certiﬁed knowledge (that of
scientists, policy-makers etc.) and non-certiﬁed knowledge
(that of publics). The notion of certiﬁcation implies a transfer
of legitimacy and hence a privileged position of some kinds
of knowledge over others.
The existence of non-certiﬁed hydrological knowledge has
been shown in a number of studies. In general, river basin
management has been an area of experimentation with re-
spect to new forms of public participation (e.g. Johnson,
2009). In a project concerned with new forms of public par-
ticipation in ﬂood risk modelling, Lane et al. (2011b) were
able to show that local ﬂood victims had developed a rich un-
derstanding of the fundamentals of hydrology and hydraulics
(Table 1) and that this was much more than just “local”
knowledge (e.g. Callon, 1999): it was universal in the sense
that it referred to generic processes. Through interviews with
the participants, Lane et al. (2011b) also showed that this
knowledge had not come from formal training, nor was it ac-
quired from a singular local place where ﬂooding had been
experienced. Rather, it was the accumulation of sometimes
many decades of living with water, a process of accumulating
knowledge through experience, not dissimilar to the scientist
who progressively accumulates knowledge through both for-
mal training and the practice of researching hydrology.
The recognition that hydrological expertise is more dis-
tributed than is commonly assumed challenges the notion
that only scientists are capable of constructing and ac-
quiring scientiﬁc knowledge and hence that only scientists
have the knowledge that can be used in informing policy.
Callon (2005) goes one step further in using the notion of
disability to describe how both publics and scientists are dis-
abled from “reasonable arbitration”, that is the ability to eval-
uate a claim, observation, statement etc. in an independent
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and biased manner. For Callon, it is a question of framing.
Scientiﬁc activity is concerned with the transformation of the
real world into objects (e.g. a hydrological model or ﬂood
inundation maps) that can be used to generate knowledge.
Strictly, the knowledge that we acquire is about the assump-
tions made in the framing, as I discuss in Sect. 2.1, and not
necessarily the world itself, although we may embark upon
a series of measures to make sure that the framing conforms
with the real world (e.g. its validation) or, if not, to force
the framing to conform with the real world (its calibration).
These framings are produced by our own experience (that
is, they have a history), our position with respect to other
framings and they evolve through our scientiﬁc practices and
hence deﬁne our futures as scientists (see also Lane, 2012).
Callon’s (2005) point is that we are often disabled in the
evaluation of our own framing because we are locked into
it, something that has been conﬁrmed by empirical research.
For instance, Lahsen (2005) showed how climate modellers
were often ineffective at identifying ﬂaws within their own
models. In one sense, such identiﬁcation may be achieved
through effective peer review processes, but when whole sci-
entiﬁc communities are locked into particular practices, even
those processes may not be effective. Smith et al. (2012)
show how ﬂood maps may become objects that serve to legit-
imisetheexclusionofwiderdebatebetweenthoseimplicated
in decisions to which those maps refer. In Callon’s terms, the
maps may become disabling devices. It is for this reason that
Callon (2005) advocates greater rather than less public in-
volvement in scientiﬁc practice because, for the public: “It
is their initial ignorance that enables them to dare to explore
new paths and to develop original competencies. Democracy
is therefore entirely an affair whose success depends on the
engagement of disabled persons. This engagement protects
the issue from the risk of being hijacked ... by elites with
no ambition other than putting it at the service of their own
interests” (p. 313).
2.3.2 Embedding knowledge and the translation of
science into policy
A failure to recognise Callon’s observation is not simply a
question of democracy but also one regarding the effective
translation of science into policy. Here, I argue that it is
not just a question of recognising the distribution of scien-
tiﬁc knowledge but also that the meaning of that knowledge
comes only from the way in which it is embedded within
the lives that hold it. For instance, particular scientiﬁc fram-
ings often imply certain expectations of people, that they
have the necessary “capital” (social, economic, cultural) to
cope with its expectations. In ﬂood risk mapping and hy-
drological forecasting, the classic example is that those at
risk from extreme ﬂood events will have the capacity both
to prepare themselves for future ﬂooding and to act when
a particular warning is issued. Research has shown that this
is anything but the case (e.g. Mustafa, 2005); not that the
associated hydrological science is wrong, nor that ﬂooding is
not a potential risk, but rather that it is not a risk that can be
rationalised and acted upon when faced with a series of much
moreseriousandpressingrisks.Theimplicitadoptionofpar-
ticular framings of a problem and their imposition upon the
public may then undermine the very real risks that the pub-
lic itself faces (e.g. Wynne, 2010). As Bijker (2004, p. 381)
notes, then, the merit of science “is accomplished in social
practice and not bestowed upon science by philosophers or
others.” The argument here is that not only should the ba-
sis of scientiﬁc knowledge be more distributed but also that
scientiﬁc knowledge only has meaning within those com-
munities who have to live with its consequences. If a disci-
pline like socio-hydrology is to be more than just analytical,
we need to think through the very assumption that its prac-
tice can be left to those who hold certiﬁed knowledge alone:
where and how socio-hydrology is practised also needs care-
ful consideration.
3 Following Manning’s n
The ﬁrst part of this paper has reviewed the three major cri-
tiques that arrive with a constructivist account of hydrolog-
ical knowledge. In this and the next section I want to fo-
cus upon predictive hydrological modelling, in the context
of these three critiques. My argument follows the structure
associated with these three critiques. First, I will begin with
a focus upon a particular element of hydrological modelling
practice as it has evolved over an extended time frame and, in
so doing, I consider Latour and Woolgar’s (1979) notion of
a “continuum of facticity” that describes the transfer of facts
between those statements that could be taken as given and
those that were speculative. For Latour and Woolgar (1979),
theworkofthelaboratorywastomovestatementsfromspec-
ulation to given. In contrast with the laboratory, what I want
to argue here is that a critical element of hydrological predic-
tion is leaving some statements speculative, what I call anti-
facts, and I illustrate this using the parameter Manning’s n,
widely used in both surface and subsurface ﬂow routing cal-
culations. Second, I will consider hydrological modelling as
a performative practice more generally, one in which mod-
elling can only proceed through a process of framing by so-
ciety, and so reversing the traditional assumption of a lin-
ear transfer of scientiﬁc knowledge into policy. I will show
that policy is needed to frame exactly how hydrological mod-
elling should be done, something that reinforces the notion of
a socio-hydrological system. Third, I will show that the need
forpolicyframingreafﬁrmstherolealternativeapproachesto
the practice of hydrological modelling, especially in the con-
text of the coevolution of hydrological and social systems,
ones that are more than just analytical, and more sensitive to
the immense power that hydrological science has to inﬂuence
the day-to-day lives of ordinary people.
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3.1 The origins of Manning’s n
Whatmore and Landström (2011a) consider “the ubiquity
of a small, italicised mathematical symbol – “n” – in the
working practices of hydraulic modellers” and, in particu-
lar, they seek to understand how despite ongoing academic
concerns, it remains as “a cornerstone of the working prac-
tices of engineering consultants which inform the policy
and practice of ﬂood risk”. A number of researchers have
sought to trace how the Manning’s formula came about
(e.g. Dooge, 1992; Whatmore and Landström, 2011a). Read-
ing Manning’s (1891) paper shows that it came from seven
existing formulae used to estimate mean section velocity
from its hydraulic radius and energy slope. Manning arrived
at two results, and concluded that if the exponent of slope in
the estimation is constant at 0.5 then the relationship should
take the form
V = Cs1/2Rx, (1)
with C the “Manning constant” and x =4/7 on the basis of
the seven formulae used. Then, in a second step, Manning
set about determining x using experimental data from Darcy
and Bazin (1865). These produced ranges of x from 0.6351–
0.6778 and 0.6176–0.6733 for cement-lined and cement-
sand lined semi-circular channels respectively. Higher val-
ues (0.7635 and 0.8395) were required for gravel-lined chan-
nels. Through a critical approximation, Manning settled on
a mean value, 2/3, because this was “sufﬁciently accurate”
(Manning, 1891, p. 175). Manning then compared this for-
mula with 170 experiments from 5 authors, including Darcy
and Bazin (1865) and found that with the exception of data
from the Mississippi, the formula performed sufﬁciently well
tobegeneralised.HeattributedtheproblemswiththeMissis-
sippi data to concerns over measurement (Manning, 1891):
“It is very doubtful whether the measurement of such a small
quantity was possible in the case of the Mississippi, notwith-
standing every care which could be taken by the able conduc-
tors of the experiments, particularly as the transverse surface
of the river is stated to have a curvature of 11 inches.” The
other element of Eq. (1) that needs attention is C which ac-
tually confuses two elements: (1) a coefﬁcient that converts
between different units (e.g. metric and imperial); and (2) a
roughness factor, n. Whilst others had already applied the
label n to a roughness factor (“Kutter’s n”), Willcocks and
Holt (1899) presented the Manning formula as it has come to
be known in metric units as
V = s1/2R2/3/n. (2)
Although n is formally Kutter’s n, it was shown to be
equivalent to roughness factor values estimated by Manning,
and in the ﬁrst part of the 20th century, n became referred to
as Manning’s n (Dooge, 1992). The steps taken to arrive at
Eq. (2) are important because they lead to a formula for esti-
mating velocity with a single parameter, Manning’s n, which
has no directly measurable equivalent. In returning to La-
tour’s notion of a continuum of facticity, this account shows
how Eq. (2) moved from speculation regarding the possible
relationships between R, s and V, to a given, something that
others would go on to describe as a “law” (e.g. Govindaraju
and Erikson, 1995; Zhang and Savenije, 2005). Nonetheless,
it has also retained something that is speculative. I will now
show that the history of Manning’s n becomes a history of
its resistance to moving along the continuum of facticity and
that, as such, its raison d’être is as an “anti-fact”.
3.2 Parameterising Manning’s n
Manning’s (1891) original objective was to develop a “ratio-
naltheoryofthemotionofwaterinanopenchannel”(p.171)
with the “desire of reconciling as far as possible those ap-
parent differences of opinions which have existed amongst
hydraulicians” (p. 171). Equation (2) reconciled those differ-
ences both in terms of the structure of the equation but also
throughintroducingaparameter,n,thathadalreadybeencal-
ibrated. Calibration here means, in effect, taking measures of
V, R and S for a number of streams and hence estimating
n (e.g. Ganguillet and Kutter, 1869; Hering and Trautwine,
1889; Scobey, 1915; King, 1918). This inverse estimation
showed that n values varied, yet if Eq. (2) is to be used
for estimation, an a priori means of estimating n is required.
Reﬂecting Manning’s desire to have a rational theory, Man-
ning’s n had to be turned into an inscription device (after La-
tour, 1999a) that would allow velocity to be estimated. Two
broad attempts developed to do this. First, Ganguillet and
Kutter (1869) had already begun to create an inscription de-
vice, based upon a classiﬁcation, in their case of rivers, into
six classes according to their surface (effectively grain size
and presence/absence of vegetation). The number of classes
expanded (e.g. to 21 in Horton, 1916) until Chow (1959) pre-
sented ranges of n values for 110 classes. The progressive in-
crease in the number of sites was needed to capture the vari-
ability of n, and Chow’s introduction of ranges for any given
site characteristic shows early resistance of Manning’s n to
becoming a fact. Second, even these kinds of tables were
hardtouse.InaUSGeologicalSurveyReport,Barnes(1967,
p. 2) wrote: “At the present state of knowledge, the selec-
tion of roughness coefﬁcients for natural channels remains
chieﬂy an art ... There are no resistance diagrams or quanti-
tative relationships available similar to those used for steady
ﬂow in uniform pipes ... Consequently the ability to eval-
uate roughness coefﬁcients for natural channels represent-
ing a wide range of conditions must be developed through
experience.”
In practice, the ability of n to become a fact is also
dependent upon human experience and, as Latour and
Woolgar (1979) showed, the network of practices built up
to sustain this experience (Barnes, 1967, p. 3): “For this rea-
son the Survey maintains a program which both trains young
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engineersin theevaluationof channelroughnessand teststhe
accuracy of roughness coefﬁcients by veteran engineers.”
Recognising that this is not ideal, the solution for
Barnes (1967, p. 2) (and then Hicks and Mason, 1991) was
“photographs of channels of known resistance are thus useful
in estimating the roughness characteristics of similar chan-
nels. The photographs and data presented in this report cover
a wide range in conditions.”
This book of photographs is a classic inscription device
in that it represents an object that a scientist can use to ho-
mogenise the study of very different ﬁeld environments so
making them referential to one another, to make them into
facts. In the words of Barnes (1967, p. 1): “Familiarity with
the appearance, geometry and roughness characteristics will
improve the engineer’s ability to select roughness coefﬁ-
cients for other channels.”
3.3 Making Manning’s n more physical
The above two strategies leave Manning’s n as a purely
empirical entity even if, as with Chow (1959), some logi-
cal physical principles are being introduced (e.g. a relation-
ship between perceived surface roughness and the value of
n required). In 1923, a Swiss scientist, A. Strickler pub-
lished Beiträge zur Frage der Geschwindigheitsformel und
der Rauhigkeitszahlen für Strome, Kanale und Geschlossene
Leitungen in the Mitteilungen des Eidgenössischer Amtes
für Wasserwirtschaft in Bern, Switzerland. Translated, this
means “Contributions to the Question of a Velocity Formula
and Roughness Data for Streams”. As was implicit in the ex-
amples above, Strickler (1923) proposed that Manning’s n
could be determined quantitatively from the median grain
size of the river boundary, so in theory making n into a fact,
controlled only by a river’s grain size:
n = aD
1/6
50 . (3)
The logic here rests upon the assumption that the vari-
ability in a riverbed’s surface increases with some measure
of grain size, and this variability should inﬂuence surface
roughness. In metric units, Eq. (3) deﬁnes the dimensions
of n as L1/6, whereas Eq. (2) deﬁnes them as L−1/3 T. Thus,
Eq. (3) is modiﬁed by introducing the gravity constant and
expressing the constant of proportionality in a slightly differ-
ent way (e.g. Brownlie, 1983):
n = D
1/6
50 /a0g1/2. (4)
The combination of Eqs. (2) and (4) results in:
V =

g1/2s1/2R2/3
a0D50

. (5)
For some (e.g. Brownlie, 1983; Lebossé, 1991) the Man-
ning equation became referred to as the Manning–Strickler
equation (Bertand-Krajewski, 2006). Strickler (1923) pro-
vided estimates of the coefﬁcient a in Eq. (3), which can be
readily transformed into a0 in Eq. (4). As French (1985) ﬁrst
noted, Strickler’s manuscript, published in German, is some-
what obscure: it was a document prepared for the Swiss Can-
tonal Authorities in Bern and is difﬁcult to obtain. French
also noted that Strickler has gone on to be reported in a mul-
titude of ways and I have shown this in Table 2. There is
variance between papers in the grain-size parameter used, the
valueoftheexponenttaken(a ora0)andtheunitsused.Some
of the exponents can be shown to be equivalent (Table 2) by
correctingfordifferencesinunits,butthereremainsaconsid-
erable variability between the estimates of n obtained using
different relationships. Thus, whilst Strickler brought in an
attempt to control n, through relating it directly and contin-
uously, if still empirically, to grain size, this relationship has
remained remarkably unstable.
3.4 Challenges from ﬂuid mechanics
Manning’s own work reﬂected a continual tension between a
desire to bring in rational theory and the need to account for
empirical evidence. Writing in 1878 (cited in Dooge, 1992)
Manning noted “there are no formulae so useful – I might
also say none of any real value – to the engineers, which are
not in some degree empirical, embodying facts arrived at by
careful experimentation.” However, there was another chal-
lenge that paralleled the development of Manning’s n that
comes from ﬂuid mechanics. Darcy’s (1856) observations of
pipe ﬂow had shown that the distribution of velocity within
the pipe depended upon pipe radius, implying that where the
diameter was larger the inﬂuence of the pipe boundary was
lower. This effect is implicit in the Manning equation as the
hydraulic radius (R) appears as the numerator and n as the
dominator. In 1914, Von Mises referred, for the ﬁrst time,
to the idea that roughness (k) in pipes of radius (r) should
be seen as relative: in other words, the energy losses in a
pipe should vary as a function of (k/r), so velocity should
be some positive function of r/k. As Darcy was unable to
measure close to the boundary, his inferences about bound-
ary roughness, including determination of his friction factor,
did not address speciﬁcally the nature of boundary effects.
However, subsequent work sought to make the link between
boundary inﬂuence and velocity, both theoretically and ex-
perimentally. Key here is Prandtl (1926) who showed from
theoretical analysis that velocity within a column of water
(i.e. ui at elevation i above the bed) should vary with the log-
arithm of elevation (y) above the bed if it is assumed that,
effectively, the rate of turbulent energy production is a func-
tion of the local velocity gradient:
ui = f (ln(y/y0)). (6)
von Karman (1930) veriﬁed this experimentally for ﬂow
in pipes. Equation (6) introduces the constant yo, strictly in-
terpreted at the elevation y above the bed at which the ve-
locity becomes zero. Nikuradse (1933), who worked under
Prandtl showed that, through a series of experiments in pipes
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Table 2. Different forms of the Manning–Strickler equation.
Source Grain size Form of Units Description of Strickler (1923) Equivalence n
parameter Strickler within reports of Strickler’s estimated
used relationship work for a
reported median
grain size
of 0.05m
Limerinos D50 [1], a = feet Derived by Strickler for stream 1 0.029
(1970) 0.0390 beds composed of cobbles and
small boulders
Simons and D50 0.0474 mm Derived by Strickler for a small 3 0.091
¸ Sentürk ﬂume with bed and sidewalls
(1976) pasted with sand
Garde and D50 [1], a = m Derived by Strickler for coarse 2 0.025
Raju (1977) 0.0417 bed streams free from bed
undulations
Richards D50 [1], a = mm Summary of Strickler’s data on 1 0.029
(1982) 0.0151 gravel-bed streams in Switzerland
Subramanya D50 [1], a = m No information given 1 0.029
(1982) 0.0474
Brownlie Mean grain [3], not Based on data from gravel-bed 2 (if m) 0.025 (if m)
(1983) size equivalent to given rivers and ﬁxed bed channels
a =0.0420
French (1985) D50 [1], a =0.047 mm Uniform sand pasted to the sides 3 0.090
and bottom of the ﬂume used by
Strickler
Chanson D50 [1], a =0.041 m No information given 2 0.025
(1999)
Bertrand- D50 [1], q = not Strickler’s analysis of 17 sets of 1 0.029
Krajewski 0.0474 given Swiss data
(2006)
of different diameter coated with sand grains of different but,
within each experiment, uniform diameter: (1) y0 could be
interpreted as the average projection of roughness; (2) this
could be taken as the diameter (D) of sand grains used; and
(3) as a result of experimental analysis, which produced a
constant A in Eq. (5) of value 8.48, y0 had to be multiplied
to 30D. The integration of Eq. (6) across the ﬂow depth, as
Nikuradse did, and noting that his analysis is for pipe ﬂow,
shows that the depth-averaged velocity, U is
U = f (ln(R/30D)). (7)
Although this result is for a velocity proﬁle rather than
a section-averaged velocity, it has introduced a relative
smoothness term, R/D, the reciprocal of a relative roughness
term. Nikuradse (1933) speciﬁcally considered pipe ﬂow, but
Keulegan (1938) used Eq. (7) to develop a general equation
for predicting mean velocity in turbulent open channel ﬂow
from R and D. By the end of the 1930s, synchronously with
development of the Strickler relationship, ﬂuid dynamicists
had developed linkages between velocity prediction, the hy-
draulic radius and the grain size of the boundary layer that
had been translated into forms suitable for application to
rivers.
3.5 Keeping the problem practical
Thesenewphysicallybasedrepresentationsofroughnesshad
a much stronger theoretical grounding than Manning’s equa-
tion and would seem to represent a threat to Eq. (2): a rea-
son for rejecting the Manning approach. However, attempts
were made to show that the relationships were approximately
equivalent (e.g. Pal, 1965). The focus was more on the prob-
lems that Eq. (7) and similar relationships represented for
specifying n using grain size (e.g. Eq. 4). In his classic study
of Brandywine Creek, despite making no explicit linkage to
Keulegan’s demonstration that relative roughness inﬂuenced
mean velocity, Wolman (1955) was able to relate n to grain
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size provided he controlled for ﬂow depth effects. By 1957,
Wolman was modelling roughness parameters (in this case
the Darcy–Weisbach friction factor) as a function of relative
smoothness (Leopold and Wolman, 1957). However, as Wol-
man also recognised (Wolman, 1955; Leopold and Wolman,
1957), determining roughness from grain size, even if cor-
rected for depth effects, overlooks the separate effects of
other controls upon roughness (e.g. vegetation, bed forms,
channel sinuosity etc.), grouped together by Luna Leopold,
in a 1960 paper written jointly with Ralph Bagnold, Lu-
cien Brush and Wolman in 1960, into distortion resistance
(that associated with changes in ﬂow direction) and spill re-
sistance (that associated with rapid changes in ﬂow velocity).
Both Wolman and Leopold et al. (1960) were clear to point
out that: “it is impossible here to evaluate the separate effects
of these factors” (Wolman, 1955, p. 21) and “for practical
reasons, distortion and spill resistance are largely overlooked
because the large-scale and discrete boundary irregularities
which cause them in natural channels are not easily described
in quantitative terms” (Leopold et al., 1960, p. 112).
Yet, grain size can be measured, that is, it can be effec-
tively used in an inscription device. Wolman (1955, p. 22)
wrote “analysis shows that the hydraulic behaviour of “grain
size” is a frictional factor, and as such, it is one of several re-
lated factors which exercise a frictional resistance. A rough-
ness n0, although perhaps not the most signiﬁcant measure
of energy and friction losses, is, at present, one which can
be obtained under ﬁeld conditions.” Thus, the mid-20th cen-
tury history of Manning’s n, as illustrated here, shows how
it remained markedly resistant to challenges from the rapidly
developing ﬁeld of ﬂuid mechanics. It did so because its util-
ity was not its theoretical superiority, although it could be
aligned with developing theory, but its suitability as some-
thing that could be practically inferred from simple grain-
size measurements which themselves could be made routine
and reproducible. By showing how to make grain-size mea-
surements reliable (in his classic “grid-by-number” sampling
paper in 1954) and by following Strickler, Wolman afﬁrmed
grain size as an alternative kind of inscription device to pho-
tographs (see also Limerinos, 1970), one which allowed n to
be proscribed in a generalised way.
Strickler’s work was developed explicitly by Limerinos in
order to develop an “objective relation between Manning’s n
and streambed particle size” (Limerinos, 1970, 4) even if it
“is not likely that the determination of n values for natural
channels will ever be an exact science” (Eq. 6). To do this,
Limerinos embarked upon a very careful piece of research
design where: “The most important criteria in selecting a site
for study was that it be relatively free from velocity-retarding
inﬂuences other than those associated with the size and size
distribution of stream-bed particles” (1970, p. 13); and “sites
that had an appreciable percentage of particles smaller than
about 3/4 of an inch in diameter were eliminated from con-
sideration to avoid the complication of having bed forms at a
site – ripple, dune or plane bed – that varied with discharge”
(1970, p. 14). Here, Limerinos has established a network
of suitable (ﬁeld) laboratories where Manning’s n can be
tied to measurement protocols that can guarantee an inter-
nally consistent objectivity, even if the values of Manning’s n
that result are biased to the sites used to determine them.
For Limerinos, even the measurability had to be reduced to
questions of practicality: “The intermediate diameter of the
streambed particles was studied because that is the diameter
most easily measurable – either by sieve analysis or by pho-
tographic techniques – and is the diameter that had been used
in previous studies by other investigators” (1970, p. 6).
3.6 Digital roughness
The ﬁnal stage of the history of Manning’s n relates to its
appearance in prototype one-dimensional numerical mod-
elling codes. The simplest, HEC-2, of these kinds of codes
became available in the 1960s, produced by the US Army
Corps of Engineers and released in 1966. Commonly called
a “step-backwater” model, the codes use the energy equa-
tion to calculate water surface proﬁles from the ﬂow velocity
(as deﬁned by a given discharge) and energy losses between
sections:
z2 + d2 +
∝2 V 2
2
2g
= z1 + d1 +
∝1 V 2
1
2g
+ hL12, (8)
where zi is bed elevation at elevation at location i, d is wa-
ter depth; α is a coefﬁcient; V is velocity and hL is the head
loss between i −1 and i. The head loss is calculated from
the energy loss due to friction between locations 1 and 2 and
the energy loss due to expansion or cross section of the cross
section between 1 and 2. The friction loss is commonly ex-
pressed as a friction slope, sf, and commonly uses the Man-
ning Eq. (2), including Manning’s n. Implicitly, Eq. (8) is
represents the ability of a river to convey water where, in
order to conserve mass, a decrease in velocity implies an in-
crease in either or both of river width and ﬂow depth. Subse-
quent models were developed in the 1970s to include more
complicated treatments (e.g. to allow for unsteady discharge)
but they all share one critical characteristic: the models con-
tain rules that need to represent conveyance, and in practice
theseareprimarilybuiltaroundtheEq.(2)Manningequation
(HR Wallingford, 2001). With this development in the 1960s,
Manning’s n became implicated in the calculation of water
surface proﬁles in predictive models of ﬂood inundation. It
is in this sense that Manning’s n has become most clearly re-
sistant to generalisation and where its continued existence is
linked to its status as an anti-fact.
In 2001, a UK-government-commissioned report (HR
Wallingford, 2001) revealed substantial uncertainty associ-
ated with the estimation of Manning’s n values in such mod-
elling studies. In a consultation of 71 modellers, 46% were
using tables, photographs or other kinds of guides, 32% were
usingexperienceand22%otherkindsofmethods.Theresult
of this survey, plus a wider literature review was a targeted
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programmeofactivitiesspeciﬁcallytodevelopaConveyance
Estimation System that would regularise how conveyance es-
timation was done in general and how Manning’s n was es-
timated in practice. This system was launched in the UK in
2004 and had two elements: a Conveyance Generator and a
Roughness Advisor (HR Wallingford, 2002). The basic ele-
ment of the Roughness Advisor is a method for estimating
unit roughness, expressed as an n, a basic roughness value
that could be combined with estimates of energy losses due
to turbulence, secondary circulation and channel sinuosity
to estimate conveyance losses (HR Wallingford, 2003). The
advisor allows both a description-based and photographic-
based selection of n. The reason for the choice of n is made
clear: it is sustained by a network of existing practice, as
HR Wallingford (2004, p. 6) noted: “The use of the Man-
ningniswidespreadandtodate,mostresistanceadvice,pho-
tographs and summation approaches in the literature are ex-
pressed in terms of “n” (Barnes, 1967; Chow, 1959; Cowan,
1956; Hicks and Mason, 1998). The Roughness Advisor is
therefore based on an n rather than a Darcy f or Chezy C,
to maintain this user familiarity and conﬁdence. This was
a critical decision made by the Project User Consultative
Group and Expert Advisory Board to receive wider user
acceptance.”
The n values were obtained from ﬁeld measurements but
also “some of the information in the roughness advisor is
derived from expert opinion rather than ﬁeld measurement”
(HR Wallingford, 2004, p. 25). In this sense, the Roughness
Advisor is a more sophisticated version of the Barnes (1967)
photographs, but with a focus upon only unit roughness.
However, the same report also demonstrates some resistance
of Manning’s n to conform to this advice (HR Wallingford,
2004, p. 27): “Calibration of the ﬂow resistance alters the
uncertainty in the estimation of conveyance. Calibration data
for ﬂow resistance should supersede the generic, non-site-
speciﬁc information in the Roughness Advisor. Calibration
may result in a different value for the central estimate of wa-
ter level for the calibration ﬂow rate and there is no guarantee
that a single roughness value will achieve a perfect calibra-
tion for water levels and ﬂow rates observed on different oc-
casions (due to natural variability).”
For this reason (HR Wallingford, 2004, p. 32) “The
Roughness Advisor enables the user to manually overwrite
the roughness values. This is essential for the calibration pro-
cess. The values entered should be interpreted as equivalent
unit roughness values, not the all-encompassing Manning n
values ...”.
These two quotes show how Manning’s n clearly performs
a function in computer models that is concerned with more
than just describing energy losses: it is needed as a calibra-
tion parameter, as a means of representing all those processes
in the model not being modelled explicitly (Lane, 2005).
Interviews with practising ﬂood risk modellers conducted
as part of a wider research project concerned with knowl-
edge production in ﬂood risk modelling (see also Whatmore
and Landström, 2011a; Landström et al., 2011a; Lane et al.,
2011a) revealed the critical role of this calibration process:
“... assuming all my rainfall data is right, and I am conﬁ-
dent in the hydrology (and that is a big assumption) what that
means is that the model is underestimating the levels and it is
too late, so what it probably needs is that I need to raise the
channel resistance in that reach. You raise the channel resis-
tance which would tend to put the level up a bit, but which
might sort of not give you the right sort of timing. Then you
reassess the assumption of the hydrology and you say – well,
maybe I got the timed peak wrong on the catchment, so I go
and reassess the timed peak on the catchment, so what you
end up with is something that looks like that. So you think –
well, maybe I am overestimating too much so perhaps I will
bring my Manning’s n down a bit. Got the timing right now.
So lo and behold you have got your really good match ...”.
This makes the estimation of ﬂood levels critically depen-
dent upon historical data, with one consultant noting (Lane
et al., 2011a): “you have a whole raft of other sorts of data,
verging from the completely anecdotal: “my kitchen ﬂooded
to six inches deep on this day”, to – if you are lucky, some
aerial photography that shows the extent of ﬂooding during
an event. And again we would attempt to use that to calibrate
or verify the models performance. When we don’t have that
data the level of uncertainty signiﬁcantly increases because
you are basing it entirely on the physical assumptions of the
model.”
This can create particular problems when those data are
themselves uncertain: “A job we did not so long ago, we
couldn’t get one of the records to ﬁt at all, our model kept
showing, I can’t remember what is was, but something like
our levels were half a meter lower than the recorded levels,
and we couldn’t get it up there at all. And after going round
and round for months, it was decided that someone better go
out and actually check the recorded level of this gauging sta-
tion, and it was out by half a meter, so we had been trying to
ﬁx, ﬁddle, change things to match this data which was in fact
wrong itself.” (Lane et al., 2011a).
These quotes show Manning’s n performing a very dif-
ferent kind of role to that of a “fact”. On the one hand, the
parameter has a history of being made measurable, one of
translation from simply a coefﬁcient in Manning’s original
formulation (Eq. 2); through its empirical classiﬁcation to
allow objective estimation of velocity; through steps to as-
cribe it more physical signiﬁcance by recognising grain-size
controls; through to sophisticated systems for its estimation
that can insure comparability between scientists’ calcula-
tions; ending with automating those processes used to deﬁne
it. However, the last part of this section shows its ultimate
resistance to transition along Latour and Woolgar’s (1979)
continuum of facticity. Despite its theoretical inadequacies
and better ways of handling roughness (e.g. Ferguson, 2007),
Manning’s n remains a parameter that is hard to avoid in
the mathematical modelling of rivers. It retains this status,
partly because it is an accustomed parameter, sustained by
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a network of experience, the familiarity and conﬁdence sur-
rounding its use, but partly because it is the perfect anti-fact
in modelling practice. That is, it serves a role as something
that has almost no directly derivable physical measure, it can
only be derived from empirical relationships with other pa-
rameters (e.g. grain size) that are themselves unstable (e.g. as
a function of discharge, or position within a river system) and
model predictions are extremely sensitive to its speciﬁcation.
As soon as Manning’s n becomes locked into an inscription
device (a table, photographs, a software system) it can no
longer provide its critical function, as an effective parameter
(see Beven, 1989 for discussion of this notion), in compen-
sating for all the other simpliﬁcations and inadequacies in
hydraulic models. It is no longer available to make the model
perform.
4 From Manning’s n to performing hydrological
prediction
The history of Manning’s n ends with the widespread use
of a parameter that can be used to optimise model predic-
tions through a process of calibration. It is possible to imag-
ine the same kind of analysis being undertaken, albeit over
different kinds of time frames, in other areas of hydrologi-
cal prediction (with reference to the Topmodel m parameter,
the widespread adoption of Gumbell-type distributions, the
persistence of particular methods of assessing ﬂood inunda-
tion etc.). However, it also points to a wider issue relating to
the role of performance in hydrological prediction and this is
where wider science studies have demonstrated the need to
move beyond work conducted in either the laboratory or the
ﬁeld to look at numerical prediction.
A wider science that studies the interest in prediction fol-
lows from the argument that computer simulation as a prac-
tice differs from other scientiﬁc approaches because it does
not aim to produce new theoretical and general explanations
of entities (Knuuttila, 2006) but rather to represent the be-
haviour that emerges from interactions between those enti-
ties (Landström et al., 2013). For instance, most hydrolog-
ical models are based upon a set of theoretical statements
(e.g.Darcy’slaw,1856)thatarecombinedtogether,thuscon-
necting a set of variables that describe the state of the system
at any one time. These variables then evolve as deﬁned by
their initial values and the theoretical statements but also ex-
ternal forcing. Central to this process is the abstraction of
the material world through the choice of particular theoret-
ical statements and their subsequent mathematical descrip-
tion and connection in a hydrological model. Landström et
al. (2011a, p. 3) describe this as “... rendering physical pro-
cesses and events virtual in [hydrological or hydraulic] mod-
els ...” Studies of modelling practice have portrayed mod-
elling as: (1) a different kind of laboratory work (e.g. Merz,
2006), reﬂecting the way in which modellers talk of “numer-
ical experiments”; (2) something that, following Latour, is
coproduced with the social order within research communi-
ties (e.g. Sundberg, 2009) as modellers develop very partic-
ular ways of modelling (e.g. the use of hydrological models
based upon similarity of hydrological response); and (3) cru-
cially, something that is performative (Knuuttila, 2006; Peck,
2008; Guillemot, 2010) through its focus upon the extent to
which predictions mimic measurements, that is, the model’s
performance (see also Lane, 2012). Knuuttila (2006) argues
that the value of a model depends upon its ability to bring
about a prediction that is adequate even if elements of the
model are demonstrably wrong. With respect to groundwa-
ter models, this has been extensively discussed by Oreskes et
al.(e.g.1994)whotalkofthewaysinwhichmodellers“force
empirical adequacy” in their models, even if this means that
they get the “right results” for the “wrong reasons” (Beven,
1989), or even the “wrong results” for the “wrong reasons” if
the data that are the object of model forcing are not correct.
Models are made to perform.
One of the few attempts to look speciﬁcally at the prac-
tice of hydrological prediction is contained in Landström et
al.’s (2011a, 2013) comparison of consultants and university
scientists. They describe how, for the consultants, the pre-
dictive modelling was undertaken in a network of formal in-
stitutions and regulatory frameworks established for manag-
ing ﬂood risk. This network deﬁned the inscription devices
(hydrological and hydraulic models, in general) that could
be used by the consultants and which guaranteed that their
predictions would be comparable to the work of other con-
sultant scientists, that is, the prediction could translate. Lane
et al. (2011a) shows that the encoding of this translation in
hydrological prediction underpins its primary raison d’être
in water resource management: a consistency in evaluation
methods that means that geographical locations can be made
comparable in space and time, and so evaluated objectively
through cost-beneﬁts measures. Porter and Demeritt (2012)
have described how ﬂood maps have performed a similar
role in the planning process in England and Wales. It is
not just the predictive models that become inscribed, it can
also be the practices that use those predictions themselves.
The attempt to develop a Roughness Advisor (described in
Sect. 3.6) as a means of setting Manning’s n values was an-
other attempt at restricting how hydraulic predictions should
be obtained. In this case, however, Manning’s n has proved
remarkably resistant to inscription because it is sustained by
a network of practice, of consultants, who needed its status
as an anti-fact in order to make their models work. Porter
and Demeritt (2012) report similar resistance on the part of
planners to the use of ﬂood maps to script the planning pro-
cess. Further, inscription devices may also create a series of
challenges or “obstacles” to be overcome by modellers (han-
dling data scarcity, dealing with data error, computational
limitations) (Landström et al., 2013). Landström et al. (2013)
showed that these challenges are not simply constraints, but
also opportunities (Montuori, 2003), the latter seen as a form
of improvisation (Landström et al., 2013) necessary to make
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the model perform. Again, the hydrological knowledge that
results from this practice cannot be understood if it is di-
vorced from the networks within which it is produced, that
is, an assemblage of elements that are material (e.g. conser-
vation of ﬂuid mass, ﬂood defences), technical (e.g. state of
knowledge, computational power), regulatory (e.g. deﬁned
modelling procedures) and human (e.g. ability to improvise,
perception).
The university scientists that were followed conﬁrmed the
importance of the networks within which science is prac-
tised. As with the consultants, they started with a particular
set of “inscription devices”, particular hydrological models,
ones to which they were accustomed through some years of
practice. However, they were working in a network that cre-
ated a different set of obstacles. They were free to choose
their modelling approach, but because they were engaged
in participatory hydrological modelling, working with local
communities to develop solutions to reduce ﬂood inunda-
tion, the obstacles were deﬁned by the solutions that came
outofcombinedacademicandcommunitydeliberations.The
scientists’ initial models were incapable of representing the
solutions identiﬁed and this forced them to create a differ-
ent kind of model. Landström et al. (2011b) describes this
as a dissociation and reattachment, in which the context in
which the scientists were working (participatory hydrologi-
cal modelling) forced them to dissociate from a network that
was largely academic and grounded in particular modelling
strategies and to reattach themselves to a second network
built around a new academic–local community collaboration.
These examples emphasise that prediction in hydrology is
concerned with much more than brute forcing of model per-
formance: who the performance is for and how it may be
undertaken is important even to the point that “the credibility
of a model comes not only from the credentials supplied to
it by the governing theory, but also from the antecedently
established credentials of the model building techniques
developed over an extended tradition of employment ...”
(Winsberg, 2003). Still, performance takes on a second and
wider meaning because these model-building techniques do
not take place freely. Lane et al. (2011a) show how hydrolog-
ical prediction is critically constrained by a suite of practices
that are not characterised simply by the conventions of scien-
tiﬁc analysis but are framed by the very management activi-
ties that they seek to inform and which determines what can
go into the performance. Lane et al. (2011a) consider the ex-
ample of ﬂood risk management. They show that what drives
this activity is not the science of ﬂood inundation but a series
of accounting practices that are necessary to deﬁne how a hy-
drological model is to be used (e.g. which simulations are to
be considered and what the boundary conditions should be).
Returning to the +20% rule described above, they showed
that certain kinds of hydrological futures were allowed to
become dominant over others through a set of codiﬁers that
allowed some types of hydrological non-stationarity to dom-
inate over other, perhaps equally provisional and unstable,
elements of the future. For instance, the River Ouse (Sussex)
Catchment Flood Management Plan (Environment Agency,
2008) reported a sensitivity analysis of the likely changes in
future ﬂood risk arising from climate change (set by apply-
ing the +20% peak ﬂow rule described above), urban de-
velopment and land management. Predictions showed that
urban development and land management would have very
little inﬂuence on future ﬂood risk. However, closer inspec-
tion of the report reveals the reason for this conclusion (En-
vironment Agency, 2008, p. 106): “Our assessment does not
include the impact of any additional building or infrastruc-
ture being placed in the ﬂoodplain in the future. It is assumed
that this will be prevented by appropriate development con-
trol, however if it were to occur, the cost of ﬂood damage
could increase signiﬁcantly, depending on the nature of the
development (economic and social value) and the depth and
frequency of ﬂooding.”
The conclusion is not that urban development is unimpor-
tant, but rather that regulation is going to prevent it from
happening in areas where it might increase ﬂood risk. Lane
et al. (2011a) note that the UK’s history of constraining ur-
ban development in response to established ﬂood risk is ex-
tremely poor. In more general terms, this is an example of
how hydrological prediction commonly involves an attempt
to reduce, through taking assumptions, the ambiguity and un-
certainty (Sterling, 2008) in those parts of the system that are
indeterminate (see Wynne, 1992) so as to make systems pre-
dictable, a process of framing. For instance, the uncertainty
of climate change effects is rendered apparently unproblem-
atic through the systematic adoption of a simple +20% up-
scaling rule. Similarly, the ambiguities of things that can-
not be known, here notably elements of the social world
(e.g.ﬂooddevelopment),arereducedthroughadditionalcod-
iﬁers (e.g. that regulation will prevent ﬂoodplain develop-
ment), also a process of framing. The reduction of ambiguity
and uncertainty is necessary to make the world predictable.
Yet, these kinds of predictions are often the basis of interven-
tion (e.g. the decision to construct a ﬂood defence) and so the
success of those interventions becomes directly reliable not
only on the reliability of the predictions but the appropriate-
ness of the codiﬁers that have been required to close or to
frame the problem and the associated suite of practices that
supports them. Not only must hydrological models mimic the
real world, if the interventions in the world that those mod-
els sustain are to be effective, the world needs to be made to
look like the codiﬁers and assumptions made by the hydro-
logical models supposed to be representing that world. There
is what Baudrillard (1981) calls a “precession of the simu-
lacra”, where our world must be made to look like what is
assumed in our models. It is one of the dimensions in which
the social world is strongly bound to the hydrological world.
The critical point that comes from this argument is that
prediction in hydrology, especially in a socio-hydrological
framework, needs to be thought through much more care-
fully because of the power that it has to shape the landscape
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around us. Of course, hydrological prediction exists to help
inform decisions that are made about water management.
However, if those predictions contain other less clearly stated
assumptions, and making those predictions sustainable re-
quires those assumptions to be achieved, then we need a
much closer integration of how we live within both hydrolog-
ical systems and social systems. This is the spirit of the new
notion of socio-hydrology (e.g. Sivapalan et al., 2011) which
calls for a much more sensitive understanding of how hydro-
logical systems and social systems have evolved together. In
the last section of this paper, however, I will go further to
argue that prediction in a socio-hydrological world must at-
tend to questions of its social accountability, through its very
own practices, if it is to achieve the relevance that it in theory
could achieve.
5 Moving beyond constructivist accounts of hydrology
As Collins and Evans (2002) argued, the social study of sci-
ence has contributed much to revealing the nature of science
as practised, with some profound implications for how we
view the contribution that science and scientists might make
to society; but this is far from arguing that science should not
be involved in decision-making. Rather, in situations where
hydrological science is being practised in public settings, it
implies the need to move beyond constructive accounts of
hydrology (the second wave), to rethink the nature and po-
sition of hydrological expertise as it contributes to societal
decision-making (a third wave). My aim in this concluding
section is to identify a number of principles as to what such
rethinking might involve in a hydrological framework.
5.1 Working with knowledge controversies
Hydrological science is inherently controversial (see Lane,
2013). For some elements of hydrological research, this con-
troversy is a necessary part of the development of the dis-
cipline, as it forces us to challenge the framings that we
bring to our research. For instance, hydrological models can
only be shown to be wrong and showing them to be wrong
may be what forces those models to develop (Beven, 2006).
Yet, when hydrological science is being practised in public
(e.g. as part of a water resource or ﬂood risk management
strategy), such controversies may become externalised. This
is facilitated through a suite of technical (e.g. internet dis-
semination, social media) and social (expectations regarding
freedom of information) changes that not only make scien-
tiﬁc knowledge readily open to scrutiny but which increas-
ingly mix facts and opinions in a very public way (Latour,
2011): search engines, tagging, tweeting etc. increasingly de-
termine what it is we think we know. However, it is not sim-
ply the case that scientists or certiﬁed experts bring facts and
publics or non-certiﬁed experts bring opinions. The nature of
hydrological science as a practice, including its uncertainty,
questions the former, and observations in Table 1 question
the latter. The controversies become more than just political
and inherently bound with knowledge.
As an example, consider the following quote from a lo-
cal resident in Pickering, North Yorkshire, UK, faced with
a controversy about a local ﬂood risk management strategy:
“And I suggested Mr [X] at the [Y] farm, who I knew. We
agreed that I would ring him and take the material. He was
very interested, and I said I would take the material to him,
and leave it with him. He rang me back the following day to
say, when was the next meeting of this Environment Agency
thing, because he would very much like to go. He was very
worried about it. I was able to tell him when the next meet-
ing was, and give him the address of the people and so on.
It all went quiet until the next meeting, when he turned up
with a sheaf of papers and, I think, about four A4 sheets of
paper with ﬁgures on, which caused quite a stir, because I
don’t think the Environment Agency had ever been tackled
before – they were quite surprised about it. There was quite
a long discussion in that particular meeting. They said they
would like to take the paperwork away, and take it back to the
ﬁrm who were organising this, and see what they said about
it. Then we had another meeting in which they said that they
certainly weren’t prepared to start on the project at Picker-
ing, because there certainly seemed to be some discrepancy
there.” (Resident of Pickering, North Yorkshire).
The quote above shows how reasoning was slowed down
through the creation of a controversy surrounding existing
knowledge claims. The ﬁrst principle then recognises that
there is an externalisation of knowledge controversies that
follows from the growing capacity of those non-certiﬁed
experts traditionally excluded from water-related manage-
ment to both access those controversies traditionally inter-
nalised and to bring their own non-certiﬁed expertise to bear
on them. It argues that when decisions are potentially con-
tentious and the associated knowledge is uncertain, knowl-
edge controversies will develop. Such controversies can un-
settle existing framings and, if they are allowed to slow
down reasoning, they may provide new framings of problems
(Stengers, 2005). We need to work with knowledge contro-
versies rather than trying to manage them or suppress them.
As Isobel Stengers puts it: “How can we present a proposal
intended not to say what is, or what ought to be, but to pro-
voke thought, a proposal that requires no other veriﬁcation
than the way in which it is able to “slow down” reasoning
and create an opportunityto arousea slightly different aware-
ness of the problems and situations mobilising us?” (2005,
p. 994).
Conﬂict and controversy, wherever it comes from, is an
opportunity for us to avoid becoming bound by our own
paradigms, to slow down our reasoning, to ﬁnd perhaps al-
ternative ways forward. If the social and hydrological worlds
have co-evolved, letting the social world back in, notably
during controversial moments, is a potentially powerful way
of innovating hydrological predictions precisely because it
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may force us to be less wedded to our existing hydrologi-
cal framings. It also represents a fundamental challenge be-
cause often institutions see the management and resolution
of controversy as a criterion of successful public engagement
(Lövbrand et al., 2010). Working with controversies implies
seeing them as beneﬁcial things to be harnessed rather than
suppressed.
5.2 Working with and staging events
Social scientists (e.g. Mustafa, 2002, 2005; Collins, 2009,
2010) who have worked in communities who live with hy-
drological extremes caution against scientiﬁc practices that
do not engage with the day-to-day livelihoods of those com-
munities. In such communities, it is often not the hydrolog-
ical extreme itself that is catastrophic, but the more hidden
and continually mutating social processes that determine a
community’s vulnerability and which make extreme events
catastrophic. For most of the time, however connected so-
cial and hydrological worlds may have become, hydrologi-
cal concerns tend to be subordinate to other considerations.
This is why events (e.g. a ﬂood) are important in creating
the controversial moments when existing problem framings
(e.g. that do not recognise the extent to which a social system
is also hydrological) may be brought into question. There is
an established literature that shows how both events in gen-
eral and hydrological events (e.g. ﬂoods, droughts) in partic-
ular can result in major changes in water policy (e.g. Erikson,
1994; Johnson et al., 2005; Lane et al., 2013). Rosario (2007)
describes this as a form of “creative destruction” where dis-
course is no longer capable of explaining the exceptional as
normal, in other words reproducing existing expert or policy
framings. Rather, out of the destruction, new policy framings
may be created.
Working with events, particularly historical events, is a
routine practice in hydrological science in both research
(e.g. the development of two-dimensional ﬂood inundation
mapping has been entirely dependent upon mapped historical
events; e.g. Bates, 2004) and practice, not least because most
hydrological models have to be forced to reproduce historical
events (see Lane et al., 2011a). However, there is a difference
between the necessity of assimilating such events into our
existing frames of reference, so as to improve those frames
(e.g.amathematicalmodel)andusingsucheventsasameans
of challenging the very frames themselves. In the dissocia-
tion and reattachment surrounding the participatory hydro-
logical modelling described above, Landström et al. (2011b)
describes how the university scientists were forced to turn
away from an existing hydrological model, and the network
of people and models that the model connected them to, as
a classical physically based, distributed approach. They went
on to develop a completely different model suited to assess-
ing multiple combinations of a large number of distributed
interventions (e.g. in-channel debris dams to reconnect the
river with its ﬂoodplain, small bunds). This shift was at one
level related to the pressing ﬂood events that had occurred in
the communities with which the scientists were participating;
but at a deeper level, the participatory modelling activity was
itself an event in the co-evolution of the socio-hydrological
system of those communities, albeit one that was staged, in
that it itself forced the scientists’ dissociation and reattach-
ment, and the eventual reframing of their way of working.
The point here is that we must be careful in seeing
“ﬂood events” as somehow different to our own interventions
(our “staged events”) as hydrological scientists in socio-
hydrological worlds. Our interventions are both shaped by
those socio-hydrological worlds (as the motivation for a
socio-hydrology, in Sivapalan et al. (2011, 2012), so effec-
tively shows) but also may have profound and not always
expected impacts upon that world. Staging events, as exper-
iments situated within communities who live with hydro-
logical problems, may provide an alternative way of both
engaging the beneﬁts of community engagement in hydro-
logical prediction and also securing new kinds of framings.
The latter may ensure that we, as hydrologists, develop our
moral imagination (Coeckelburgh, 2006) so as to be more
sensitive to the socio-hydrological world within which we re-
search. However, for this potential to be realised we need to
be acutely sensitive to the political and ethical ramiﬁcations
of what we do, rather than simply seeing these as elements to
be excluded so as to secure some kinds of “pure” scientiﬁc
approach.
5.3 Being empirical and experimental
Working with events in general, and the staging of events in
particular, can both be seen as a strong commitment to be-
ing empirical, where we give primacy to evidence that can
be acquired through experience above and beyond theory, or
particular frames of enquiry. In this sense, this principle is
a comfortable one for hydrology as a ﬁeld or laboratory sci-
ence, grounding our work in what we can experience and us-
ing this experience to test our speculations, framings etc. as
we attempt to move them along Latour and Woolgar’s (1979)
continuum of facticity and as we attempt to allow certain
explanations to stabilise in preference to others (Stengers,
2000). If we continually expose our framings or hypotheses
to the test (cf. Beven, 2001), and events staged or otherwise
help us to do this, we will escape the problems that arise
when particular framings become both stable and dominant.
There is a clear parallel here with wider approaches to work-
ing with what are sometimes called “wicked problems” (after
Rittel and Webber, 1973), ones that at any one point are not
completely understood despite progress in managing them
needing to be made, such that management has to be “adap-
tive”, especially in the face of uncertainty (Holling, 1978).
But a comment follows. This principle advocates a wider
deﬁnition of what the empirical might be, namely, as more
than just what can be measured. In the way that a socio-
hydrological world involves more than just hydrology, it also
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implies a widening of what we, as hydrologists, admit into
our studies of that world. The socio-hydrological world is re-
plete with instances where what is either difﬁcult or impos-
sible to measure dominates how we make decisions (e.g. the
role of heuristics in determining how we live with risk, see
for example; Slovic, 2000); and such information requires a
much broader deﬁnition of what we mean by the empirical.
This is particularly important to avoid Baudrillard’s (1981)
precession of the simulacra, described above, in which the
assumptions about human behaviour necessary to make pre-
dictions in a socio-hydrological world have to be reproduced
in the management of the world around us, so that our pre-
dictions remain viable. Such an activity can only lead to the
kinds of thought control that Aldous Huxley imagined in a
Brave New World (1932), where we have to render human
subjects as objective through making them conform to the
conditions required for that objectivity (Latour, 1999b). As
Huxley’s ﬁctional account shows, the only consequence of
such a rendering is that human subjects become inherently
incapable of being objective, that is, incapable of evaluating
their day-to-day lives through any framework other than that
which is imposed upon them.
Thus, being empirical in a socio-hydrological world will
need a strong commitment to combined social-hydrological
investigations that frame the way that prediction is under-
taken, rather than leaving consideration of social and eco-
nomic considerations as concerns to be bolted on to the end
of a hydrological study. In the words of Stengers (2000,
p. 160): “... It is not a question here of having citizens
“vote” ... [e.g. on hydrological futures] ..., but of invent-
ing apparatuses ... [e.g. forms of public participation in hy-
drological research] ... such that citizens of whom scientiﬁc
experts speak ... [e.g. in socio-hydrological models or mod-
elling projects] ... can be effectively present, in order to pose
questions to which their interest makes them sensible, to de-
mandexplanations,topositconditions,tosuggestmodalities,
in short to proceed in the invention ... [of socio-hydrological
predictions].”
Being experimental follows directly from being empirical.
The notion of experiment is effectively deﬁned as a sought-
for experience (following Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum
Scientiarum, published in 1620), that is, empiricism through
design. It carries the belief that an idea or notion has to be
tested, and that this can be done through experimental proof
(Stengers, 2000). Again, this is a comforting notion to a hy-
drologist, and in a socio-hydrological world, it points to the
importance of both events in general, and staged events in
particular, as forms of experimental activity. Still, it has a
wider implication: in a socio-hydrological world, it is not
simply a case of putting hydrologists’ notions of the hydro-
logical world or the social world, as “certiﬁed experts”, to
the test, but also those of non-certiﬁed experts, recognising
that publics may be “no more pusillanimous than the re-
searchers ... no more prisoners of their beliefs than the ex-
perts” (Callon, 1999, p. 88). Putting knowledge to the test is
about more than simply seeing local people as a source of
local knowledge to test what we scientists believe, assumed
necessary for hydrologists to make better predictive models.
It is about creating forms of participation, experiments, in-
volving both certiﬁed and non-certiﬁed hydrological experts
that allow all hydrological expertise to be put to the test.
5.4 The co-production of socio-hydrological predictions
The notion of the staged event or experiment described above
challenges the supposed importance that a gap is maintained
between the concerns of hydrological science with the hy-
drological world, typical more generally of traditional mod-
els of scientiﬁc activity, and those concerns of the social
world. Sivapalan et al.’s (2011) notion of socio-hydrology
challenges this gap substantively; my account above does so
methodologically. The importance of a methodological di-
mension is threefold. The ﬁrst is political. As noted above,
with a commitment to excluding politics from science, so
that scientiﬁcally derived knowledge is deemed authoritative,
we are actually making a political statement, because we are
transferring considerable power to those invested as scien-
tists (Latour, 1999b). In effect, we are denying the existence
of two different elements of the framing process (Wesselink
and Hoppe, 2011), the “is” that relates to the framing of
the problem by knowledge production, and the “ought” that
refers to “the norms, values, ideals and interests at stake”
(Wesselink and Hoppe, 2011, p. 399). If special status is
given to framing the “is”, and hence to certain individuals
(i.e. scientists), then there is a risk that inadvertently we are
also transferring to scientists a right to frame the “ought”.
That is, in tying to strip values, beliefs, and politics out of
science, so as to guarantee its claim to a higher form of
knowledge, we are simultaneously transferring to scientists,
perhaps inadvertently, substantial power in deﬁning what the
considered norms, values, ideals and interests should be.
The second follows in relation to socio-hydrological pre-
diction, and is concerned with democratic accountability.
As Aumann (2011) argues, because model predictions re-
late to a not yet known future, and because those predic-
tions need to make assumptions about more than just the
natural world, there is a democratic responsibility to allow
those being described by those models to be equally in-
volved in assessing those assumptions made. The third is
more practical. Lane (2012) argues that hydrological mod-
elling has evolved a series of practices (e.g. repetition in
experiment, experimental control, statistical inference, peer
review) as an internal (and partly externalised when pub-
lished) means of strengthening trust in the knowledge it pro-
duces. If practising such science develops the trust that we,
as scientists, hold in our own work, then the only means by
which others might develop that same trust may be through
involvement in the same practices (Yearley, 2005). This is
particularly the case given the uncertainty endemic to socio-
hydrological modelling as discussed above. There is a clear
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rationale for inventing apparati (after Stengers, 2000) that al-
low us to stage socio-hydrological experiments. Following
Callon (2005, p. 312) it: “... [implies] ... the establishment
of a concerned group ... [that] ... involves a process of
exploration and experimentation that gradually endows that
group with the competences it needs to clarify its preoccu-
pations, to demonstrate the existence of those issues and to
organise investigations on possible solutions ...”
One way of thinking about such an apparatus is to see the
objective of research as being the co-production of knowl-
edge (e.g. Callon, 1999) in which progress is made through
apprenticeship to the active creation of knowledge about a
problem in a specially created public forum, a special kind
of staged experiment. Such a forum may have a number of
characteristics. First, it should have a “matter of concern”,
not necessarily pre-deﬁned, which motivates a sense of con-
troversy and hence a motivation and commitment from both
certiﬁed and non-certiﬁed experts to address that matter of
concern. Second, the staging makes the forum “an event”
and the event is designed to be experimental in the sense
that the forum is experimenting with making an interven-
tion in the evolution of the controversy, through the co-
production of knowledge (Lane, 2013). Third, those impli-
cated in the forum should apprentice themselves to the pro-
duction of knowledge regarding the matter of concern rather
than to what they know or think that they know or desire
a priori. Fourth, such a forum should bring into sharp fo-
cus the uncertainty and inadequacy of existing accounts re-
garding the matter of concern, whether those of the certiﬁed
or the non-certiﬁed. Doing that may require help, such as
by rendering able those objects that are capable of demon-
strating to us what it is we do not know (Latour, 1999b),
such as ﬂood risk maps. Fifth, such a forum should be con-
cerned with more than just debate, but active production of
socio-hydrological knowledge, or “testimony” (e.g. oral ac-
counts, measurements, photographs, models predictions, re-
ports) that forces us to reappraise what is, precisely, our mat-
ter of concern. Sixth, this testimony, including its produc-
tion, should slow down reasoning so that alternative framings
can develop and, in due course, new approaches to socio-
hydrological prediction might come about.
5.5 Environmental Competency Groups as an example
of co-production
I have recently been involved in the development of such
a forum, called the “Environmental Competency Group”
(ECG; Lane et al., 2011b; Whatmore and Landström, 2011b)
in two locations in England: Pickering, North Yorkshire,
a town on Pickering Beck, a tributary of the Yorkshire
Derwent; and Uckﬁeld, East Sussex, in southern England,
on the Uck River, a tributary of the Sussex Rye. In both
cases, there was a history of ﬂood events, but also little
progress towards delivering a ﬂood risk management scheme
that was sufﬁcient and acceptable in the eyes of the local
community members. The problems were profoundly socio-
hydrological. For example, in Pickering, the matters of con-
cern were not simply related to managing hydrological risk,
but equally about the urban riverscape and its protection, a
co-evolved socio-hydrological system.
ECGs were organised in each location for a period of 9- to
12 months. Recruitment to the groups focused upon identi-
fying local members for whom ﬂooding was a matter of per-
sonal (and not professional) concern, who would then work
with academic members to produce new knowledge in rela-
tion to ﬂooding in each locality. Thus, the groups tended to
exclude those stakeholders linked to governmental organisa-
tions, and they were also not designed to be representative
through some kind of artiﬁcial sampling. It was recognised
that “representation” required an a priori closure of the prob-
lem, to deﬁne what was to be represented. As the ECGs were
not representative, their contribution was not designed to de-
ﬁne or to solve a problem, but rather to create new knowl-
edge that might slow down reasoning, allowing the space for
new framings of the problem to be created. For instance, in
Pickering, advertisements in newspapers, shops and libraries
were used to identify possible ECG members. These were
then interviewed by a Facilitator to help to identify those for
whom ﬂooding was a matter of personal concern and who
were willing to sign up to a set of basic principles, including
producing rather than just talking about knowledge in collab-
oration, over a 9-to 12-month period (see Lane et al., 2011b,
for more details). The Facilitator organised the meetings and
was also responsible for engaging with local members be-
tween meetings to support and to address their concerns.
Broadly speaking, initial meetings in both locations were
designed to establish the ECGs and their principles, includ-
ing those described above, but also to overcome a series of
prejudices upon the part of both academic and local mem-
bers. For instance, at the start and in both cases, there was
a sense amongst local members that “knowledge” resided in
the academic members. To address this, all members were
encouraged to bring objects that somehow demonstrated
their personal connection to ﬂooding as a matter of concern,
such as a piece of damaged carpet, old photographs, a lap-
top that had been destroyed. The initial meetings were also
designed to frame the kind of ﬂooding that the group would
look at. Through discussion of both past events as experi-
enced in particular places, experience of other places, knowl-
edge of reports, but also the hydrological knowledge of aca-
demic members, the nature of ﬂooding in the two locations
was identiﬁed, the kinds of analyses required were discussed,
and ways forward for testing were considered. This framing
wasimportant,asitrapidlytiedgroups’activitiestobothpre-
dictive modelling as a means of producing new knowledge
and the data needed to sustain those models. Local members
as well as academics formulated what the models should do
and were actively involved in setting them up, using them,
and discussing the results. The models became powerful “ob-
jects” in challenging what it was that both academic and
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local members thought that they knew about hydrological
processes and management in both of the studied locations.
In both cases, at one level, the end result of the ECGs
was a product. In Pickering, it was an exhibition at-
tended by over 200 people, along with a report Mak-
ing Space for People in Flood Risk Management, a di-
rect play on the UK government’s Making Space for Wa-
ter strategy in ﬂood risk management (DEFRA, 2005). The
group’s work was incorporated into a DEFRA demonstra-
tion project Slowing the Flow (http://www.forestry.gov.uk/
fr/INFD-7YML5R), although the DEFRA project emerged
separately and in parallel with the ECG work. In Uckﬁeld,
the product was more focused on the model itself, and whilst
this was not ﬁnished at the end of the Uckﬁeld ECG, a Mas-
ters student took the modelling forward, applying it in the
Uckﬁeld catchment to identify a series of low-level inter-
ventions that are now being taken forward in a collabora-
tion amongst the local members and the local Environment
Agency. The key element of both of these end results was not
that the problem of reducing ﬂood risk in the study catch-
ments was resolved. Rather, each ECG was able to create
new knowledge about ﬂood risk that was able to move the
controversy on, in different directions, notably towards ﬂood
risk reduction that used the wider catchment rather than sim-
ply relying upon local ﬂood defences. However, there was a
second level of “output”. In both cases, this output can be
described as a “socio-hydrological public”, that is, a group-
ing of ordinary people, communities and academics, with a
new sense of their socio-hydrological knowledge. This out-
put was not a solution to pressing hydrological problems, but
rather a public that was capable of making ongoing interven-
tions in the development of socio-hydrological policy in both
cases. In this sense, the purpose of these socio-hydrological
research projects was neither pure (e.g. the development of
new hydrological understanding) nor applied (e.g. the de-
velopment of new approaches to hydrological prediction)
but rather the creation of socio-hydrological publics capa-
ble of intervening in ways that slowed down reasoning and,
ultimately, created the space for new kinds of hydrological
management.
It might be argued that the problem that we considered
here had already been framed and that our Environmental
Competency Groups were doing little more than expand-
ing the pool of knowledge working within that frame: in
what ways did the ECGs genuinely open up the “delibera-
tive space” associated with ﬂooding (Lövbrand et al., 2010)?
Indeed, in both of the case studies where we tried out Envi-
ronmental Competency Groups we could not escape the fact
that we were bringing some kind of framing to the problem:
wehadchosentwositeswhereﬂoodingwasaliveandimpor-
tant issue. Nevertheless, through the way we approached the
problem, as academics, we were forced to reframe the prob-
lem that we had arrived with. As described above, we were
forced to break away from our normal networks of practice
and invest in and involve ourselves in creating new networks
with new framings of the problem. Practically, these new
framings meant that we could not use the mathematical mod-
elswewantedto,norcouldweexplorethekindsoflandscape
interventions that we were most interested in. At one level,
the frame remained “ﬂooding”; but at another, the framing
had evolved substantially as we had to develop new mod-
els and test interventions with which we were not entirely
comfortable but which the new network, involving those for
whom ﬂooding was a “matter of concern” had deﬁned. This
is the sense in which participatory knowledge production can
contribute to the democratisation of decision-making even if,
on its own, it cannot provide a sufﬁcient account of how de-
cisions are made. In both of the cases we studied, prior to our
intervention, the problem had been closed down, framed as
beyond all possible solution. Our interventions, very much in
the words of Stengers (2005), slowed down the progress of
the reasoning that these ﬂoods could not be managed. Whilst
our knowledge production did not produce solutions, it did
provide enough knowledge to reframe ﬂood risk manage-
ment strategies, where new and unforeseen “solutions” are
now being applied. It did this because the new knowledge
that was created shook the existing and assembled systems of
decision-making (see Lane et al., 2013) in the terms of these
systems’ own reference, that is, knowledge. In turn, it gave to
local members of the Competency Groups a newfound capa-
bility, through their knowledge, to inﬂuence decision-making
processes previously closed to them. This was not because
they were not normally consulted, but rather because during
normal consultations, local members did not have any mean-
ingful knowledge with which to challenge decision-makers,
and the consultants that they employed. The Competency
Groups were profoundly anti-technocratic in that, whilst the
Competency Groups developed new forms of technical ex-
pertise, the right to hold that expertise was not deﬁned by the
level of an expert’s technical certiﬁcation. Of course, anti-
technocratic does not mean democratic, but there is a debate
to be had as to whether the shift in power described here re-
sults in processes that are more democratic.
6 Conclusions
In 1999, in the millennium issue of the British Journal of So-
ciology, Bruno Latour wrote “... it might be about time for
socialandnaturalscientiststoforgetwhatseparatesthemand
start looking jointly at those “things” whose hybrid nature
has, for many decades now, already uniﬁed in practice ...”
(Latour, 1999b, p. 116). Socio-hydrological systems, ones
associated with the co-evolution of humans and water (Siva-
palan et al., 2012), will be “things” that have to be hybrid be-
cause their explanation cannot be reduced to their component
parts. However, the essence of my argument in this paper
is that embracing socio-hydrological systems as a substan-
tive research concern necessarily implies a reformulation of
the relationship between us as hydrological scientists, other
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kinds of scientists, notably social scientists, and the world
that we seek to study. We cannot avoid our motivation for a
socio-hydrological approach coming from the world as we
see it; and we must also recognise that the science that we
do can itself intervene in that world, the more so when the
boundaries of hydrological enquiry are enlarged to include
an explicitly social component.
My review of the three broad critiques that sustain the no-
tion that scientiﬁc knowledge is constructed appear to be
equally relevant to hydrological practice: how we present
what we do, including our supposed separation from the ob-
jects of our study may not always hold, whatever our in-
tentions may be, as we actively create scientiﬁc knowledge
through the ways in which we frame what we do; hydrolog-
ical science does not appear to linearly ﬂow into policy and
practice;andthosewholivewithwater-relatedproblemsmay
also contain substantial hydrological knowledge. Our socio-
hydrological world is made through socio-hydrological sci-
ence in practice, and this includes the practices associated
with hydrological prediction. My analysis of one small but
important element of hydrological prediction, roughness pa-
rameterisation using Manning’s n, emphasises how effec-
tive prediction requires “anti-facts”, those parameters that
are extremely resistant to quantiﬁcation through either pro-
cess relationships or measurements because they are needed
to make models perform. Further, I show that hydrological
prediction can only proceed when it is framed by social deﬁ-
nitions (e.g. as to what return period infrastructure must pro-
tect to, and hence the river ﬂow that must be applied to ﬂood
inundation models) something that further challenges the no-
tion that scientists study socio-hydrological systems in isola-
tion from those systems.
However, if socio-hydrological practices are also informed
by social deﬁnitions, socio-hydrological investigations must
also understand what it is that shapes those deﬁnitions,
including their political and ethical content. This requires
social science to be undertaken with hydrological science
throughout the practice of prediction, and not simply bolted
on to the end of hydrological enquiry, as sometimes is the
case. The last section of my argument drew upon a series
of principles that might be used in these kinds of investiga-
tions. These principles include, ﬁrst, the importance of work-
ing with knowledge controversies, especially those increas-
ingly externalised in socio-hydrological enquiry, through
new forms of knowledge dissemination (e.g. the internet).
Such controversies may provide an opportunity to challenge
particular hydrological framings of the world and to inno-
vate in the kinds of predictive models that we use. Second,
we need to continue to make use of hydrological events, but
also to recognise that when we work in a socio-hydrological
world, our activities may themselves constitute an event, one
that has the power to transform local communities through
the science that we do. Intervening in a socio-hydrological
world can never be simply analytical, because that analysis
may go on to have transformative effects for the livelihoods
of people in those communities studied. Thinking about
our interventions as staged events should force us to think
through precisely what might result from the work that we
do in a broader sense than simply the hydrological science
we wish to develop. Third, we need to recognise that work-
ing in a socio-hydrological system can help us to be both
empirical and experimental in ways that prevent our lock-in
to particular frames of enquiry. The notion of experiment,
where knowledge is put to the test, is a reminder that all of
us, whether certiﬁed or not, learn most when we discover
that what we thought we knew no longer holds, that we
are wrong. Finally, we need to develop and to explore ways
in which we can co-produce socio-hydrological knowledge
through working in the socio-hydrological systems that inter-
est us. Social scientists have developed and tried out a wealth
of ideas for this kind of investigation. Thus, my primary con-
clusion from reading Sivapalan et al. (2011, 2012), is that
doing prediction in a socio-hydrological world is going to re-
quire some very different kinds of hydrological practices as
we as hydrological scientists learn to work closely with so-
cial scientists, those who best know how to work with and in
the social world.
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